

*Maria Lewicka**

REGIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF IDENTITY: A COMPARISON OF POLAND AND UKRAINE¹

The paper discusses the findings from a survey conducted on representative samples from three historically dissimilar regions of Poland (Eastern Poland, Galicia, western and northern regions) and two in Ukraine (western and eastern Ukraine). It outlines the results of analyses investigating regional disparities in Poland and Ukraine, and similarities shared by all the five regions in terms of different aspects of local and national identity, taking into account the role of objective factors affecting regional disparities (mainly urbanisation rates). A series of cluster analyses has proven that the area of Poland is much more homogeneous than that of Ukraine. Likewise, western Ukrainians showed more similarity to the inhabitants of eastern and south-eastern regions of Poland than to the eastern parts of Ukraine.

Regional differentiation as a (potential) object of psychological research

Despite its homogenous ethnic composition, Poland is a country with considerable regional disparities in many aspects: land relief, level of economic development, unemployment figures, political views and electoral behaviours, urbanisation rate, traditions of self-governance and civic activity, and also such issues as final examination results at lower and upper secondary school levels (Bartkowski 2003; Gorzelak 2004; Rosner 1999; Zarycki 1997, 2002). Even though the origin of these disparities is usually put down to the partitions of Poland, according to some authors (Hryniewicz 2000) they date back to earlier periods of Polish history. Regional disparities relating to various economic indicators are also emphasised by many authors. For instance, the areas of the former Congress Kingdom of Poland (*Kongresówka*) and Galicia, unlike the territory of western and northern Poland (also known as the Western and Northern Territories, *Ziemie Odzyskane*, i.e. territories which have formed a part of Poland since the end of World War II), are ones with a prevalence of municipalities (*gmina*) with the lowest per capita GDP levels and the lowest investment figures. In the so-called 'golden hundred' of Polish local governments (an annual survey carried out by the Centre for Regional Studies – CBR – for

* Faculty of Psychology, University of Warsaw.

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the *Rzeczpospolita* daily), invariably more gminas are ranked from western and south-western Poland than from eastern and south-eastern Poland. As compared with the western and northern regions, the areas of the former Congress Kingdom have a more underdeveloped infrastructure (e.g. roads or running water supply, cf. Pięcek 1999), and inferior demographic indicators such as a lower proportion of women to men and a higher share of post-working age population (cf. Frenkel 1999; Gorzelak 2004). In these comparisons, Galicia is ranked somewhere in the middle, and does not have any worse demographics figures than the western territories.

Nevertheless, there exist categories in which the areas of eastern and south-eastern Poland surpass the western and northern regions. Official unemployment figures are the highest in the west and north of the country, mainly in the voivodeships (*województwo*) of Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie, and the lowest – in eastern and southern Poland (Gorzelak 2004). Even if these indicators leave hidden unemployment, which is more widespread in rural areas than in cities (Gorzelak 2004), out of the picture, according to Bartkowski (2003) being unemployed in a village where until recently all land was owned by state farms, and which is a typical village in western Poland, is different (meaning: worse) than being unemployed in a Galician village where strong social links and private land ownership are measures protecting people from marginalisation and most severe poverty. Also indicators of social pathology (such as crime or divorce rates) which can be regarded as manifestations of social atomisation, are higher in western and northern Poland than in the former Congress Kingdom and particularly in Galicia, and regional disparities remain high even when the urbanisation rate factor, a strong predictor of social pathologies, is controlled (Bartkowski 2003).

Even though it is widely believed that the level of educational attainment is higher in western and northern Poland (cf. Bartkowski 2003), the quality of education seems higher in the eastern and south-eastern regions. The results of annual lower secondary school exams, which, being nationally standardised, allow for such comparisons, show that 12-year-old pupils living in western and northern regions, as well as in Greater Poland (Wielkopolska) achieve much worse results than those living in Galicia and Eastern Poland (data of the Central Examination Board, <http://www.cke.edu.pl>). The results of this year's secondary school exam (*matura*) are strikingly similar: the lowest percentage of failed exams was noted in the Małopolskie region (under 10%), followed by Lubelskie and Podlaskie (about 12%), and was the highest in Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorskie, Lubuskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie (over 16%). Therefore, the potential cultural capital seems to be higher in more conservative regions of the country, even though this does not translate into the share of well-educated people participating in the region's public life. For instance, the level of education of local councillors in western and northern Poland is higher than in the municipalities of eastern and south-eastern Poland (cf. Gorzelak 2004).

Poland's electoral geography shows distinct regional disparities which reflect the differences in social and political views of citizens. While eastern and south-eastern regions traditionally tend to vote for right-wing and peasant parties, western and northern regions voters opt for left-wing and centre-left parties (cf. Gorzelak 2004; Zarycki 1997). The last parliamentary election confirmed this rule: the ideologically conservative and socially populist Law and Justice (PiS) party won in the majority of constituencies of eastern, central and south-eastern Poland, while the economically liberal and less ideologically conservative Civic Platform (PO) prevailed in the majority of western, northern and south-western constituencies.

In light of the above, we can say that the east-south opposition in Polish social and political space does not allow for any definite conclusions. The economic openness and entrepreneurship of the western regions is coupled with social atomisation and social pathologies, whilst closed, traditional communities of Eastern Poland and Galicia offer a 'cushion' for their residents which protects them against excessive shocks or blows but can at the same time hinder development and stifle enterprise. Bartkowski's hypothesis (2003, p. 194) on the coexistence of pathological and innovative attitudes in the western and northern regions, which are mutually contradictory at the levels of individuals but can concur at the level of communities, is corroborated by the findings of the survey in question (not discussed in this paper). Among the three 'psychological types' distinguished in the surveyed representative sample, two prevailed in the western and northern territories: on the one hand, enterprising and satisfied individuals, though having weak links with the local community, and on the other – patent 'losers', discontented with their situation and socially isolated. In the remaining regions covered by the survey, specifically in Galicia, the third category was more common: individuals having strong roots in the local community and with a relatively high level of life satisfaction (Lewicka 2005).

History has left its indelible mark not only on the regional disparities in Poland. The neighbouring Ukraine, which has enjoyed independent statehood since 1991, after World War II incorporated some territories which, despite being ethnically Ruthenian (Ukrainian), since the 14th century formed an integral part of the Polish state, and for over 100 years were a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire (together with this part of Poland), which could imply that in many aspects they resembled the eastern regions of Poland, particularly western Galicia. The other furthestmost – eastern – part of Ukraine has for centuries remained in the sphere of Russian influence. Its exposure for so long to external political and cultural influences was reflected in the internal disparities dividing the country, much stronger than those which were caused by a more than 100-year period of partitions in Poland. Arguably, the most significant trace of these different courses the history has taken is Ukraine's electoral geography: while eastern Ukrainians largely opt for parties propagating communist ideology and call for closer links with Russia, western Ukrainians tend to vote for nationalist parties on the one hand, and for the pro-European and liberal direction repre-

sented by ‘Our Ukraine’ (NSNU) party on the other. In the last presidential election, the line of division between the followers of Yushchenko and those of Yanukovych almost exactly coincided with the boundary of the First Republic of Poland, and the popularity of Yanukovych grew with the proximity to the eastern border, and that of Yushchenko – with the proximity to the western border of the country. It should be emphasised that the differences between eastern and western Ukraine mainly pertain to the country’s policy towards Russia rather than to its EU policies. To a question asked in 2003, whether Ukraine will gain or lose after its (potential) EU accession, and to a similar question concerning Ukraine’s membership of the Russia-dominated Common Economic Space, in the responses to the former question, the difference between the residents of eastern and western Ukraine was 0.51 points on a 5-point scale (with more positive attitudes in western Ukraine), and 2.41 points in the responses to the latter question (with more positive attitudes in eastern Ukraine). It has to be pointed out that a relatively high share of the residents of eastern Ukraine are in favour of EU membership. The results of the same survey indicated that if the EU referendum had been held at that time, 44% of Ukrainians from eastern oblasts and 61% from western oblasts would have voted for EU accession (Lewicka 2005, the findings come from the survey discussed in this paper).

Naturally, the differences between eastern and western Ukraine reach beyond electoral geography and foreign policy. Eastern Ukraine is populated by a majority of Russians, and Russian is the prevalent language, whereas western Ukraine is basically ethnically homogenous, with Ukrainian being the main language. The dominant religion of eastern Ukraine is the Orthodox faith, while most western Ukrainians are Greek Catholics. Research has shown that western Ukrainians have a stronger sense of national identity, while eastern Ukrainians manifest various forms of supra-national identification (they view themselves in terms of occupation, social status, age group – cf. Hrycak 2001; Czernysz 2003). Western Ukraine is conservative and observes traditional morality, while in eastern Ukraine there are more offences against law and morals (Riabczuk 2003). And although in the time of the Orange Revolution, when the secession of eastern oblasts looked like a real threat and Ukrainian intellectuals tried to convince us that there were no differences between western and eastern Ukraine, even ordinary tourists could see them with the naked eye. The influence of Poland (and Austria) in western Ukraine, and of Russia in eastern Ukraine, is the most frequently suggested reason for such disparities, the only difference being that eastern Ukrainians are rather friendly towards their Russian neighbours, while the attitude of western Ukrainians to Poles is ambiguous, to put it very mildly.

This short examination shows that regional disparities refer not only to objective factors such as economy or demography but also (and maybe pre-eminently) to a certain ‘regional mentality’, a local equivalent of ‘national mentality’. The *centuś* (penny-pincher) in Kraków and *cwaniak* (dodger) in Warsaw, the orderliness and organisation of Poznań dwellers – regional differences in the mentality

rarely become an object of psychological research. There can be little doubt, however, that regional differences concerning the psychological features of regional communities – which are consequences but also causes of differences in other spheres – can be a fascinating subject for psychologists. While taking into account the role of historic, social and economic factors in the shaping of specific human traits (which are also shaped by them), psychological research can provide new insights into the findings of contemporary social psychology, which are static in nature and frequently isolated from the socio-historic context. The study discussed in this paper is an attempt to tackle this subject.

The findings reported here come from a large representative survey, which compared three historically and culturally dissimilar Polish regions (two voivodeships of the former Congress Kingdom, two in western Galicia and four in the so-called Western and Northern Territories) and two Ukrainian regions (four oblasts in western Ukraine and three in eastern Ukraine). Although the survey incorporated a number of different variables, in this paper – apart from demographic variables – we will mainly focus on the broadly understood issue of identity: local (place) identity, local social ties and national identity. The role of the attitude to the place of residence and local ties, which are among the main factors of regional differentiation along the eastern-western axis of Poland, is highlighted by such researchers as Bartkowski (2003). This specific selection of variables was also affected by the other objective of the study, which was to attempt a comparison of eastern and western Ukraine – regions where identity issues seem to be fundamental sources of regional conflicts and frictions (Czernysz 2003; Hrycak 2001), and give rise to such spectacular affairs as the Orange Revolution.

Even though it was expected that the three surveyed regions of Poland would prove to be more homogenous (i.e. similar in their psychological characteristics) than the Ukrainian regions, split for centuries, some internal mentality differences were also anticipated in Poland. It was expected therefore that the residents of the western and northern regions, populated after World War II and for this reason burdened with a ‘post-migration awareness’ (Bartkowski 2003, p. 183), would be characterised by a low level of psychological rootedness, that is a lower declared interest in their own individual history and the history of their place of residence, a lesser sense of attachment to place and weaker neighbour relations than the traditional communities of Eastern Poland and Galicia (cf. also Zarycki 2002). It was also predicted that in the western and northern regions there would be a lower level of self-identification in terms of the place of residence, region, country and nation, and a higher level of European and cosmopolitan identification than in the remaining two regions. It was also assumed that social attitudes would be less conservative and less nationalistic among the residents of the western and northern regions than among the residents of Eastern Poland or Galicia.

The comparison of the neighbouring areas of Poland and Ukraine seemed particularly interesting. It was underpinned by a hypothesis that if Poles and

(western) Ukrainians had shared a common history for so many ages, then probably the residents of western Ukraine would be more similar in the aforementioned aspects to the residents of eastern and south-eastern parts of Poland (especially the Polish Galicia) than to the residents of eastern Ukraine which had for centuries been under the influence of Russia. Due to these circumstances, we expected that the residents of the western oblasts would be characterised by a stronger degree of conservatism, nationalism, local bonds and sense of rootedness than the residents of eastern Ukraine, which would – in psychological terms – render eastern Ukraine more similar to the western and northern regions of Poland. Therefore, the inhabitants of the most pro-Russian region could – paradoxically – better fulfil the precepts of EU policy which opts for the weakening of nationalist and conservative attitudes and the strengthening of local and cross-border identity of the EU Member States than the overtly pro-European yet more conservative and nationalistic at heart inhabitants of western Ukraine.

The method

The surveyed areas

The survey covered representative samples of three Polish regions and two Ukrainian regions, including four voivodeships in the west and north of Poland (Dolnośląskie, Lubuskie, Zachodniopomorskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie, $N = 601$), two voivodeships of Eastern Poland (Podlaskie and Lubelskie, $N = 370$) and two voivodeships of western Galicia (Podkarpackie and Małopolskie, $N = 357$), four oblasts of western Ukraine (Volyn, Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk, $N = 450$) and three oblasts of eastern Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Donetsk, $N = 450$). Owing to the well-known language division of Ukraine, the surveys intended for the residents of western Ukraine were translated into Ukrainian, and those for the inhabitants of eastern regions – into Russian. In both countries, the respondents were drawn using the same criteria: region, sex, age, education and size of the place of residence (four categories: cities over 200,000, cities between 50,000 and 200,000, cities under 50,000 and rural areas/villages) and based on the same drawing procedure. The survey in Poland was carried out by the Sopot-based PBS (Pracownia Badań Społecznych) in May/June 2003, and one in Ukraine – by the Lviv-based SOCIOINFORM – Ukrainian Centre for Public Opinion Research in November/December 2003.

Variables and their indicators

In addition to demographics, the one-hour questionnaire included information about the respondents' attitude towards their place of residence, national attitudes, object of self-identification, social ties, civic activity, life satisfaction and socio-political opinions. In this paper, we will only discuss indicators related to

the place of residence as well as local and national identity. The tools and measures applied are shortly characterised below. The psychometric characteristics of the tools, viz.: number of answer categories, reliability of the scales applied, extents of explained variance (when a given tool was subject to factor analysis) are shown in Table 1. The scores are first shown separately for the Polish and Ukrainian samples, and then are aggregated form for the two samples.

Table 1. Psychometric characteristics of the applied tools

Variable	Number of statements	Number of answer categories	Scale reliability and percentage of explained variance			Indicator
			PL	UA	PL+UA	
Cultural capital (education)	3	5	$\alpha = 0.79$ 71.23%	$\alpha = 0.81$ 72.26%	$\alpha = 0.80$ 71.59%	Factor score
Cultural capital (books)	2	5	$\alpha = 0.70$ 76.89%	$\alpha = 0.66$ 75.21%	$\alpha = 0.68$ 76.16%	Factor score
Identification with neighbourhood	7	5	$\alpha = 0.84$ 52.8%	$\alpha = 0.79$ 45.12%	$\alpha = 0.82$ 49.01%	Factor score
Identification with location of residence (place)	7	5	$\alpha = 0.84$ 52.54%	$\alpha = 0.79$ 45.42%	$\alpha = 0.82$ 48.93%	Factor score
Identification with the country	7	5	$\alpha = 0.78$ 45.70%	$\alpha = 0.78$ 43.97%	$\alpha = 0.79$ 45.49%	Factor score
Scale of neighbour relations	6	5	$\alpha = 0.82$ 52.47%	$\alpha = 0.85$ 57.44%	$\alpha = 0.83$ 53.77%	Factor score
We were wronged	10	7	$\alpha = 0.72$ 53.4%	$\alpha = 0.85$ 59.2%	$\alpha = 0.81$ 59.9%	Mean values from 10 scales
We wronged others	10	7	$\alpha = 0.91$ 68.4%	$\alpha = 0.93$ 74.5%	$\alpha = 0.92$ 59.4%	Mean values from 10 scales
We are owed	10	7	$\alpha = 0.90$ 54.5%	$\alpha = 0.90$ 69.5%	$\alpha = 0.90$ 65.1%	Mean values from 10 scales
We owe	10	7	$\alpha = 0.89$ 52.3%	$\alpha = 0.91$ 69.4%	$\alpha = 0.90$ 65.6%	Mean values from 10 scales
Nationalistic feelings	2	7	$\alpha = 0.48$ 66.06%	$\alpha = 0.50$ 66.63%	$\alpha = 0.50$ 66.91%	Factor score
Interest in roots and knowledge about roots	5	5, 6, 7	$\alpha = 0.57$ 65.75%	$\alpha = 0.58$ 65.95%	$\alpha = 0.61$ 47.01%	Factor scores of two factors: interest and knowledge
Conservatism	12	6	$\alpha = 0.37$ 44.78%	$\alpha = 0.29$ 54.08%	$\alpha = 0.34$ 52.95%	Mean value

Source: prepared by the author.

Altogether, the following information was used in the comparisons made in the paper:

(1) Demographics: age, sex, respondents' education, parents' education, number of family members, nationality, place of birth of the respondents, of their parents and grandparents, period of residence (to date) in a given home, place, region (i.e. voivodeship or oblast). In addition, the pollsters assessed the respondents' standard of living using a 7-point scale (from 'definitely below average' through 'the national average' to 'definitely above the average'). The respondents were also asked about the number of books in their own and in their parents' libraries (on the following scale: 0, 1–10, 11–50, 51–200, 201–1,000, over 1,000). These data were used later to construct several indicators used in the analysis;

a) Cultural capital index, based on the information on the level of the respondents' and their parents, education and information about the size of the home library – of the respondents and their parents. In further calculations, the scores of two factors were used: relatively 'formal' cultural capital (level of educational attainment of the respondents and their parents) and 'spiritual' capital (size of the respondents' and their parents' libraries) (Table 1);

b) Rootedness index, showing the respondents' sense of rootedness in their place of residence, based on the information on the length of stay in the current location and the place of birth (of the respondents and their ancestors). On the basis of the latter, the index for the represented generation in a given location was calculated (0 – arrival in a given location; 1 – born in a given location; 2 – at least one of the parents born in a given location; 3 – at least one of the grandparents born in a given location). A similar index was calculated for the generation in the region, which, for the purposes of this study, was arbitrarily defined as a 150km radius from the location of residence in Poland, and a 200–250km radius in Ukraine. Due to the similarities in the history of regions intersected by state borders (Eastern Poland and western Ukraine, and a similar border for eastern Ukraine and western Russia), being born within a relevant radius from the current place of residence outside the country within its present borders (for example in Chełm or its vicinity for the residents of western Volyn, in Kursk or Bilhorod for the residents of the Kharkiv oblast, in Rostov-on-Don for the residents of the Donetsk oblast, etc.) was regarded as having ancestry in a given region;

c) Regional 'modernisation' index, based on the information about the region's urbanisation rate (four categories of place size) and household size: the higher the percentage of largest city dwellers and the lower of rural dwellers, and the smaller the household, the higher the 'modernisation' level).

(2) Perceived attachment to the place of residence, declared self-identification, 'psychological rootedness' (links with the past) and the strength of local neighbour relations were surveyed using the following tools:

a) Strength of place attachment was measured using the shortened, 9-point Scale of Identification with the Place of Residence, filled in separately for the respondent's home and its vicinity, location and country. The tool was tested many times on the occasion of previous studies, carried out in Poland and

Ukraine (Lewicka 2004a), and its psychometric characteristics are definitely satisfactory (cf. Table 1). The measure used in the comparisons was the factor score for identification with the neighbourhood, with the town/village and with the country;

b) Self-identification was measured using a tool consisting of several questions whereby the respondents were requested to select and determine the hierarchy of the three key objects of identification: their own town/village, region, country (Poland or Ukraine), Central and Eastern Europe, Europe, the world or, finally, 'simply humankind'. The measure of self-identification of a given type was ranking the identification object as one of the first three. A similar tool has been used in many sociological surveys conducted in Poland (cf. e.g. Bartkowski 2003) and Ukraine (Czernysz 2003; Drul 2001), and therefore it allows for making relevant comparisons;

c) 'Psychological rootedness' was surveyed using five questions concerning the respondents' declared interest in their roots (concerning both the family and place of residence), presence of family history in the stories told by parents or grandparents and the respondents' knowledge about the forenames of their ancestors and their place of residence (for more information see Lewicka 2004b). Thus, a two-factor solution was obtained: 'interest in one's roots' and 'knowledge about one's roots' (Table 1). The factor scores were the measures used for comparisons;

d) The strength of relations with neighbours was surveyed using the shortened Scale of Neighbour Relations, consisting of 7 questions; in their answers, the respondents said what were the proportions of neighbours (from 'nearly every one' to 'none') with whom they maintained different types of contacts, ranging from a nodding acquaintance to such manifestations of trust as leaving the keys when going for holidays. This one-factor scale had earlier been used in many research projects both in Poland and Ukraine (Lewicka 2004a, 2004b), and all the analyses indicate that it has a high degree of reliability (cf. Table 1). The factor score was used in the calculations.

(3) National attitudes. Information about the respondents' national attitudes was obtained on the basis of several tools:

a) The subscale of the aforementioned Scale of Identification with Place of Residence concerning identification with the country and (also mentioned above) the position of the 'country' as the object of self-identification on the Scale of Self-identification (Table 1);

b) Two questions, one of which was related to the sense of pride due to being Polish/Ukrainian, and the other – to the belief that Poles/Ukrainians, in their history, behaved more honourably and nobly than other nations. Both these questions correlated highly, and the resultant scale has an acceptable level of reliability (Table 1). The factor score was used in the comparisons.

c) The scale of perceived mutual injustices and debts of gratitude towards Poles/Ukrainians from other nations. First, the respondents, on four general scales, assessed the degree of injustices incurred by Poland/Ukraine from other nations,

injustices incurred by other nations from Poland/Ukraine, their debt of gratitude towards Poland/Ukraine, and that of Poland/Ukraine towards them. Then, they completed the same exercise for ten other nationalities: Americans, Austrians, Czechs (Romanians in the Ukrainian sample), Frenchmen, Lithuanians, Germans, Russians, Swedes (Belarusians), Ukrainians (Poles) and Jews. Altogether, in the comparisons within the countries and between them, four measures were used – the mean scores from 10 scales (assessment of perceived injustices incurred from other nations, assessment of injustices inflicted on others; assessment of perceived debts of gratitude towards other nations and assessment of other nations' debts of gratitude vis à vis the respondents' nation) (cf. Table 1).

(4) Liberal versus conservative attitudes. Liberalism vs. conservatism was measured using an original tool modelled on Tomkins' Polarity Scale (1963; Robinson et al. 1999), consisting of 12 pairs of statements. The task of the respondents was to choose the statement from one pair that they agreed with, and determine, on a scale of 1 to 3, to what extent they agreed with it. Statements refer to such issues as for example absolutism vs. relativism of values, punitiveness vs. liberalism, liberal vs. authoritarian style of raising children, emphasis on morality vs. competences, preference for centralised vs. decentralised system of education, etc. According to Tomkins' theory, all these are aspects of a dimension referred to as left-wing vs. right-wing ideologies or 'normative vs. humanistic' attitudes. In the study in question, this dimension was called 'conservatism-liberalism'. Owing to the small homogeneity of the scale (cf. Table 1), the mean value of answers was used as the measure in the case of this tool.

Procedures for comparing regions

Analysis of similarities between regions was made in two steps: first, separately for the three regions of Poland and two regions of Ukraine, and then, jointly – for the five regions taken together. In the first analysis, individual variables were taken into account, and in the second – the variables grouped in broader thematic categories.

Comparisons within the two countries. In the comparisons, either raw measures (average values of relevant subscales, frequency measures) or standardised indices for each of the samples independently (factor scores were calculated separately for the Polish and Ukrainian samples) were applied. Standard tests for difference relevance were used: single-factor ANOVA (Polish sample), t-student tests (Ukrainian sample), and – in the case of frequency indices – tests. We also tested to what extent the observable regional disparities resulted from the fact of belonging to a region, and were therefore manifestations of a specific 'regional mentality', and to what extent they could be artefacts arising from objective differences between the regions, particularly in the sphere of the urbanisation rate level which has a substantial effect on the majority of social attitudes and behaviours. Therefore, in order to eliminate the influence of the urbanisation rate factor, a series of variance analyses was carried out, with the

introduction of the size of the place of residence (four factor levels) in addition to the region (three factor levels in Poland and three in Ukraine).

Joint comparison of the five regions. In this comparison, the comparison criteria were standardised for both countries. In the case of frequency measures or mean values from the relevant scales, these measures were naturally identical with those used in the first analysis. However, for those factors which had the form of factor scores, factor analyses of the tools for the Polish and Ukrainian samples jointly were run first; then, the variables were recorded in the form of relevant factor scores. In this way, the indices were standardised collectively for the two samples.

The comparisons were made using the hierarchical cluster analysis, where individual variables were combined to create several broader categories: the five regions were compared in terms of several indicators jointly. The following general categories were included in the exercise:

(a) Cultural capital – five indicators were taken into account: the respondents' education, education of both parents; size of the library (in the respondents' and their parents' home);

(b) Region's 'modernisation' – the following indicators were included: the region's urbanisation rate and the number of household members;

(c) Objective rootedness in the place of residence – period of living in a given location (home, neighbourhood, town/village, voivodeship/oblast) and represented generation in the present location and region;

(d) Local identity and psychological rootedness – the following factors were included: level of identification with the neighbourhood, level of identification with the place of residence, selection (or not) of the place and region as object of self-identification; interest in the respondents' own roots, knowledge about one's roots and the strength of neighbour relations;

(e) National attitudes – including such indicators as: level of identification with the country, nation as the object of identification, national attitudes (pride of being Polish/Ukrainian; conviction that the respondents' nation in the past behaved more nobly than other nations) and opinion about mutual injustices and debts of gratitude of the respondents' country and ten other countries;

(f) Conservative vs. liberal ideologies: the average score on the liberalism-conservatism scale was taken into account.

Finally, a summary hierarchical cluster analysis was carried out on all the factors jointly.

Results

Regional disparities between Poland and Ukraine in terms of the urbanisation rate and demographics

The urbanisation rate, measured by the number of the population living in cities to that inhabiting rural areas, was in the surveyed sample significantly higher

in the western and northern regions than in Eastern Poland and Galicia. These differences could primarily be observed in smaller and medium-sized cities (under 200,000) and rural areas (cf. Table 2). The disparities in this sphere were even greater in Ukraine: 50% of the surveyed sample of the eastern Ukrainian oblasts, as compared with 22% in western Ukraine, lived in cities with a population over 200,000, while the respective figures for the inhabitants of rural areas were: 15% in eastern Ukraine and over 48% in western Ukraine (Table 3).

Table 2. Regional disparities in Poland (category variables) – shown as a percentage

Characteristic	Category	West- ern and northern regions	Eastern regions	Galicia	df	χ^2
Size of city:	over 200,000	15.1	20.8	15.7	6.1328	67.084***
	51–200,000	14.5	7.0	12.6		
	under 50,000	37.6	21.6	22.1		
	village	32.8	50.5	49.6		
Identification:	Place	52.2	64.6	58.3	2.1328	14.456***
	Region	23.3	28.9	27.7	2.1328	4.473 n.i.
	Nation	87.2	90.8	91.9	2.1327	6.269*
	Central and Eastern Europe	3.3	5.1	3.1	2.695	0.260 n.i.
	Europe	33.3	22.4	23.2	2.1328	18.037***
	The world	12.8	9.5	3.9	2.1328	20.614***
	Humankind	63.7	69.5	65.5	2.1328	3.360 n.i.
Generation in the place of residence:	New arrival	69.5	50.5	44.1	6.1312	212.26***
	Born	20.1	14.3	8.1		
	Parents born	9.2	16.5	16.0		
	Grandparents born	1.2	18.6	31.7		
Generation in the region:	New arrival	34.2	6.0	6.5	6.1307	468.12***
	Born	32.5	9.5	5.9		
	Parents born	25.3	34.1	26.8		
	Grandparents born	7.9	50.4	60.7		

* – $p < 0.05$; ** – $p < 0.01$; *** – $p < 0.001$

Source: prepared by the author.

Table 3. Regional disparities in Ukraine (category variables) – shown as a percentage

Characteristic	Category	Western Ukraine	Eastern Ukraine	df	χ^2
Size of city:	over 200,000	22.4	50.4	3.900	135.897***
	51–200,000	7.8	14.0		
	under 50,000	21.1	20.4		
	village	48.7	15.1		
Identification:	Place	60.2	78.2	1.900	34.217***
	Region	37.1	49.6	1.900	14.190***
	Nation	89.6	68.0	1.900	62.533***
	Central and Eastern Europe	3.1	6.4	1.900	5.495*
	Europe	14.4	6.9	1.900	13.479***
	The world	18.7	12.2	1.900	7.155**
	Humankind	73.3	74.0	1.900	0.052 n.i.
Generation in the place of residence:	New arrival	44.7	51.1	3.900	17.458***
	Born	10.9	16.9		
	Parents born	13.1	10.7		
	Grandparents born	31.3	21.3		
Generation in the region:	New arrival	8.9	19.6	3.891	62.501***
	Born	3.3	11.7		
	Parents born	11.8	16.7		
	Grandparents born	75.9	51.9		

* – $p < 0.05$; ** – $p < 0.01$; *** – $p < 0.001$

Source: prepared by the author.

On average, households were smaller in the western and northern parts of Poland than in the eastern and southern regions (Table 4), and in eastern Ukrainian oblasts as compared with western oblasts (Table 5), which partly (and only partly) could be attributed to the differences in the regional urbanisation rates (Table 6).

Table 4. Regional disparities in Poland (continuous variables): mean values (M) and standard deviation (SD)

Characteristic	Western and northern regions		Eastern Poland		Galicia		df	F
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD		
Cultural capital – education	0.039b	1.00	-0.145a	0.963	0.086b	1.016	2.1245	5.47**
Cultural capital – books	0.126a	0.983	-0.080b	0.950	-0.127b	1.016	2.1303	8.76***
Number of household members	2.85a	1.54	3.22b	1.64	3.20b	1.73	2.1325	11.658***
Length of stay in the home	18.45a	12.67	21.36b	15.85	24.13c	15.49	2.1324	17.79***
Length of stay in the neighbourhood	22.35a	14.32	26.96b	18.35	30.38c	17.98	2.1275	26.56***
Length of stay in the place of residence	30.35a	15.80	32.72a	18.25	35.75b	19.04	2.1273	10.42***
Length of stay in the voivodeship / oblast	35.73a	15.52	39.45ab	17.73	38.28b	20.57	2.1265	5.392**
Identification with neighbourhood	-0.185a	1.032	0.131b	0.930	0.176b	1.000	2.1317	19.43***
Identification with town / village	-0.164a	1.030	0.044b	0.938	0.229c	0.906	2.1319	18.14***
Identification with the country	-0.061ab	1.071	-0.01bc	0.940	0.113cd	0.926	2.1313	3.38*
Nationalist feelings	-0.107a	1.028	0.064b	0.936	0.117b	1.002	2.1303	6.619***
We were wronged	3.93b	0.82	3.58a	0.85	3.86b	0.78	2.1307	21.52***
We wronged others	1.43b	0.39	1.30a	0.37	1.39b	0.41	2.1308	12.76***
We owe	2.81b	1.06	2.51a	1.17	2.85b	1.04	2.1309	10.87***
We are owed	3.57b	1.18	3.02a	1.18	3.35b	1.12	2.1304	24.28***
Neighbour relations	-0.13a	1.01	0.05b	0.96	0.17b	1.00	2.1268	10.330***
Interest in roots	-0.11ab	1.01	0.04bc	1.00	0.13c	0.96	2.1262	6.909***
Knowledge about roots	-0.11a	1.00	-0.07a	1.02	0.25b	0.94	2.1262	15.584***
Conservatism	0.40a	0.73	0.71b	0.77	0.72b	0.77	2.1190	26.87***

* – $p < 0.05$, ** – $p < 0.01$, *** – $p < 0.001$

Key: mean values marked with letters differ by $p < 0.05$.

Source: prepared by the author.

Table 5. Regional disparities in Ukraine (continuous variables)

Characteristic	Western Ukraine		Eastern Ukraine		df	t
	M	SD	M	SD		
Cultural capital – education	-0.088	1.02	0.095	0.97	829	-2.648**
Cultural capital – books	-0.106	1.02	0.107	0.97	894	-3.210***
Number of household members	3.53	1.29	3.08	1.19	897	-5.462***
Length of stay in the home	24.68	16.81	18.40	13.59	898	6.158***
Length of stay in the neighbourhood	26.75	18.08	20.72	13.88	898	5.615***
Length of stay in the place of residence	35.44	18.19	33.44	15.92	898	1.753 n.i.
Length of stay in the voivodeship / oblast	39.04	17.49	36.37	16.16	898	2.374*
Identification with neighbourhood	0.082	0.951	-0.082	1.041	898	2.470*
Identification with town / village	0.075	0.973	-0.075	1.022	898	2.266*
Identification with the country	0.101	0.975	-0.101	1.015	898	3.06**
Nationalist feelings	0.261	0.82	-0.278	1.10	852	8.174***
We were wronged	3.60	0.91	2.62	1.20	898	13.80***
We wronged others	1.23	0.36	1.19	0.36	898	1.61 n.i.
We owe	2.40	1.15	1.75	1.07	898	8.76***
We are owed	3.35	1.21	1.45	0.51	898	28.93***
Neighbour relations	0.126	0.870	-0.128	1.102	892	3.838***
Interest in roots	0.196	0.936	-0.202	1.024	869	5.989***
Knowledge about roots	0.152	0.928	-0.157	1.047	869	4.615***
Conservatism	0.46	0.77	0.30	0.74	898	3.255***

* – $p < 0.05$, ** – $p < 0.01$, *** – $p < 0.001$

Source: prepared by the author.

No regional disparities between the two countries were found in terms of the residents' age or number of children. The standard of living evaluated by the pollsters in the Polish sample depended solely on the size of the location (the lowest in rural areas, and the highest in the largest cities: $F(3.1327) = 10.30$, $p < 0.001$). In the Ukrainian sample, it depended both on the region, $F(1.900) = 24.62$, $p < 0.001$, and on the size of the town/village, $F(3.900) = 7.33$, $p < 0.001$. The pollsters assessed the standard of living of eastern Ukraine as significantly lower than in western Ukraine, which can be found surprising since GDP per capita in eastern Ukraine is 40% higher than in the western regions of the country (Hrycak 2001).

Table 6. Main effects of region and the size of towns/villages for the comparison criteria in Poland and Ukraine

Variable	Poland		Ukraine	
	Region	Size of towns/villages	Region	Size of towns/villages
Cultural capital – education	F(2.1236) = 1.54	F(3.1236) = 6.92***	F(1.831) = 1.09	F(3.831) = 33.80***
Cultural capital – books	F(2.1294) = 1.28	F(3.1294) = 6.57***	F(1.896) = 0.570	F(3.896) = 25.79***
Number of household members	F(2.1063) = 6.94***	F(3.1315) = 26.46***	F(1.892) = 17.70***	F(3.892) = 10.60***
Length of stay in the home	F(2.1315) = 8.50***	F(3.1315) = 13.04***	F(1.892) = 9.20**	F(3.892) = 19.11***
Length of stay in the neighbourhood	F(2.1266) = 9.37***	F(3.1266) = 34.41***	F(1.892) = 5.13*	F(3.892) = 22.48***
Length of stay in the place of residence	F(2.1264) = 3.83*	F(3.1264) = 0.508	F(1.892) = 0.248	F(3.892) = 7.94***
Length of stay in the voivodeship / oblast	F(2.1256) = 1.30	F(3.1256) = 4.97**	F(1.892) = 0.275	F(3.892) = 4.60**
Identification with neighbourhood	F(2.1308) = 5.35*	F(3.1308) = 38.88***	F(1.892) = 5.75*	F(3.892) = 9.56***
Identification with town / village	F(2.1310) = 12.01***	F(3.1310) = 13.54***	F(1.892) = 1.31	F(3.892) = 24.37***
Identification with the country	F(2.1304) = 3.47*	F(3.1304) = 2.72*	F(1.892) = 5.00*	F(3.892) = 15.82***
Nationalist feelings	F(2.1294) = 6.62***	F(3.1294) = 2.96*	F(1.846) = 47.74***	F(3.846) = 7.98***
We were wronged	F(2.1298) = 15.50***	F(3.1298) = 5.53***	F(1.892) = 132.06***	F(3.892) = 3.77**
We wronged others	F(2.1299) = 15.17***	F(2.1299) = 11.53***	F(1.892) = 0.298	F(3.892) = 0.072
We owe	F(2.1300) = 8.02***	F(3.1300) = 5.62***	F(1.892) = 45.02***	F(3.892) = 0.508
We are owed	F(2.1295) = 24.00***	F(3.1295) = 2.65*	F(1.892) = 545.75***	F(3.892) = 7.45***
Neighbour relations	F(2.1259) = 0.901	F(3.1259) = 37.40***	F(1.886) = 5.37*	F(3.886) = 24.04***
Interest in roots	F(2.1253) = 2.35 n.i.	F(3.1253) = 13.16***	F(1.863) = 21.22***	F(3.863) = 9.40***
Knowledge about roots	F(2.1253) = 5.40***	F(3.1253) = 11.65***	F(1.863) = 35.42***	F(3.863) = 2.77*
Conservatism	F(2.1181) = 14.82***	F(3.1181) = 8.22***	F(1.892) = 6.21*	F(3.892) = 10.78***

* – p < 0.05, ** – p < 0.01, *** – p < 0.001

Source: prepared by the author.

Objective rootedness

Based on the body of knowledge to date, the western and northern territories, populated after World War II, are characterised by a substantially lower objective level of rootedness of its inhabitants than the traditionally Polish eastern and south-eastern regions. The inhabitants of the western and northern regions have lived in their present place of residence, neighbourhood, town or village and voivodeship for a much shorter period than the residents of Eastern Poland and Galicia (Table 4). These differences can largely be explained by the varying urbanisation rates of the surveyed regions (cf. Table 6). A more thorough comparison of the average values showed that the observable regional disparities in the length of stay in the present place of residence are mainly related to rural inhabitants (a higher degree of ‘settledness’ of the residents of Galician villages than in the villages of the western regions).

Another measure of objective rootedness was the represented generation. In the surveyed sample, the inhabitants of the western and northern regions came from younger generations in the place and region of their residence (Table 2) than the inhabitants of the other two Polish regions. Over one third of the present inhabitants of the western and northern regions arrived there from other areas, and only about 8% represented the third generation (one of the grandparents was born in this region), whereas the respective figures for the eastern and south-eastern regions were: approx. 6% of new arrivals and 50–60% of third generation representatives (Table 2). It should be pointed out that 31.6% of the surveyed inhabitants of the western and northern regions had some form of lineage from the Eastern Borderlands (*Kresy* in Polish – areas of Poland which after World War II were incorporated into the Soviet Union) in one of the three generations, and the values for Eastern Poland and two former Galicia voivodeships were 9.5% and 5.1%, respectively.

Similar though weaker disparities in terms of objective rootedness can be observed in Ukraine. On average, the inhabitants of eastern Ukraine have lived in their present home, neighbourhood and oblast for a shorter period than the inhabitants of western Ukraine (cf. Table 5), even though – similarly to Poland – the dissimilar urbanisation rate in both regions was a strong determinant of these differences (Table 6). In addition to that, the inhabitants of eastern Ukraine also represented ‘younger’ generations with regard to the present location and region of residence (Table 3). The residents of western Ukraine formed a particularly ‘well-settled’ group – in that part of the country the third generation in the present region of residence was represented by nearly 76% of the surveyed sample.

Ethnic differences

Unlike Poland, Ukraine is a much more ethnically heterogeneous country, with the widest disparities observable in eastern Ukraine. Of all the surveyed

respondents of eastern Ukraine, 23.3% described themselves as Russians and 73.6% as Ukrainians, as compared with 4.2% Russians and 95.1% Ukrainians in western Ukraine. In the eastern Ukrainian sample, 39.6% of the respondents were either born or had ancestors who were born in what is now Russia or in other former republics of the Soviet Union, and this proportion in western Ukraine was 11.6%. At the same time, 11.1% of the respondents or their ancestors in western Ukraine came from Poland, as compared with 2.0% in eastern Ukraine.

Regional disparities between Poland and Ukraine in terms of cultural capital

The two measures of cultural capital used in the research comprised 'formal' capital, made up of the level of education of the respondents and both their parents, and 'spiritual' capital, manifested as the size of the respondents', and their parents' private libraries. Comparisons showed that there were regional disparities in respect of the two types of cultural capital in both surveyed countries. Inhabitants of the western and northern regions were characterised by a higher level of 'formal' capital than (particularly) the residents of Eastern Poland, and a higher level of 'spiritual' capital than the residents of the two eastern and south-eastern regions (Table 4). In the case of Ukraine, similar differences were noted, both in favour of eastern Ukraine (Table 5). Additional analyses taking into account the nationality of the respondents surveyed in Ukraine showed that Russians residing in western Ukraine had a notably high level of cultural capital while the cultural capital of Ukrainians in this region was exceptionally low (a significant interaction between region, country and nationality, $F(1.814) = 13.82$, $p < 0.001$ for 'formal' capital and $F(1.878) = 18.40$, $p < 0.001$ for 'spiritual' capital).

However, subsequent analyses, which also included the urban factor along with the regional factor, showed that regional disparities in terms of cultural capital in Poland and Ukraine were affected by the variable: size of place (town/village), which entirely eliminated the regional effect in both countries (Table 6). It should be emphasised, however, that in the surveyed sample the relationship between the size of place and the size of the two capitals was not linear. In Ukraine, the lowest levels of the two types of capital were recorded among rural residents, followed by residents of cities between 50,000 and 200,000, and the highest – among the dwellers of the largest cities.

Regional disparities between Poland and Ukraine in terms of local identity

Subsequent analyses dealt with the issue of the 'psychological rootedness' of the respondents, involving their psychological ties with the place of residence, interest in their own history, strength of neighbour relations in the place of residence and declared self-identification in terms of the place of residence and region of the country. All these factors pointed to distinct regional disparities.

The inhabitants of the western and northern territories basically felt less attached to their immediate neighbourhood (vicinity of their home and town or village) than the inhabitants of the eastern regions or Galicia (Table 4). In their most part, these disparities resulted from the varying degree of urbanisation in the three regions (Table 6): residents of villages, much more common in eastern and south-eastern Poland, showed a closer attachment to the place of residence than city dwellers, with the linear character of the relationship between the size of place and declared attachment to the place of residence. Nevertheless, regardless of this objective factor, it was found out that also the disparities along the 'east-west' axis played an important role because the residents of the western regions declared a much weaker attachment to their place of residence (neighbourhood, town/village) than the inhabitants of the eastern and south-eastern parts of the country (Table 6).

The relationships between place attachment are more complex in Ukraine. A simple comparison of the disparities between eastern and western Ukraine revealed significant differences in favour of western Ukraine in terms of neighbourhood and place attachment (Table 5). Inclusion of the factor: size of the place of residence revealed more complicated relationship patterns. This factor significantly differentiated attachment – both to the neighbourhood and to the place of residence, and in the latter case it entirely eliminated the region effect (Table 6). Although the region effect could be observed in the case of neighbourhood attachment, the interaction between region and the size of place was also significant, $F(3.899) = 10.76$, $p < 0.001$. In the eastern regions, rural residents manifested the greatest attachment to their neighbourhood, and the smallest attachment was expressed by the residents of small and medium-sized cities, while in the western regions the residents of medium-sized cities (up to 200,000) showed the highest level of attachment, with no significant differences observable among the remaining respondents.

Similarly differentiating were two other measures of 'psychological rootedness': interest in one's roots (family history, history of place) and knowledge about these roots. The inhabitants of the western and northern regions declared a substantially weaker interest in their roots than the inhabitants of Galicia, and they had a distinctly smaller knowledge about their roots (e.g. expressed by knowing their ancestors' names and their places of birth) than the residents of Galicia. The inhabitants of the eastern regions ranked somewhere in between in respect of these two measures (Table 4). Similar regional disparities could be observed in Ukraine: residents of the eastern oblasts showed a lesser interest in their roots and had a poorer knowledge about them than residents of the western oblasts (Table 5).

A question could naturally be asked whether this declared interest in family roots, and knowledge associated with it, is not a simple function of the represented generation: someone who knows that his or her family has inhabited a given place or region for years has a better knowledge about the place of birth of their ancestors (for example by the sheer visiting of their graves in the local

cemetery) than someone who represents 'newer' generations. This would explain a higher level of knowledge of more 'well-settled' residents of Galicia than the newly arrived residents of the western or northern regions. However, what we could also expect is such a relationship in reverse: the new arrivals, with no evident roots, should have a keener interest in their past and the history of the place who is their new homeland than the 'well-settled' inhabitants of the area.

In view of the above, we analysed the impact of the region and the represented generation on the extent of the declared interest in the respondents' roots and knowledge about these roots. Analyses were carried out separately for Poland and for Ukraine. The 'generation' factor did indeed prove to be a variable which significantly affected the extent of professed interest in, and knowledge of the roots, even though it did not eliminate the influence of the region. The factor of 'generation in the region' played a particularly important role; as it turned out, it strongly affected the extent of knowledge about the roots both in Poland, $F(3.1251) = 113.01$, $p < 0.002$, and in Ukraine, $F(3.863) = 64.29$, $p < 0.001$. As for interest in the roots, the influence of generation was less obvious in both countries (in Poland, the impact of the generation in the region on interest in the roots was $F(3.1251) = 3.77$, $p < 0.01$, and in the place of residence – $F(3.1255) = 4.69$, $p < 0.01$, as compared with Ukraine's, respectively, $F(3.862) = 6.43$, $p < 0.001$ for generation in the region and $F(3.871) = 4.69$, $p < 0.1$ for generation in the place of residence).

It should be emphasised, however, that the relationship between the represented generation and interest in, and knowledge of the roots was not linear. While in nearly all cases the persons who represented the third generation (one of the grandparents born in a given place or region) declared the greatest interest and had the most extensive knowledge about their roots, in the majority of cases, the second largest group in terms of the intensity of variables was made up of new arrivals in a given town or village, while the worst results in both these categories were recorded among the respondents who represented the second generation (one of the parents born in a given place or region). We can conclude therefore that both the most and the least 'rooted' residents seem to have the keenest interest in their roots.

Despite the significance of the 'generation' factor, the influence of 'region' on interest in the roots and in knowledge about them was also significant in Poland and Ukraine. This factor was particularly strongly connected with interest in the roots in Ukraine, $F(1.871) = 25.67$, $p < 0.001$ (in the case of the analysis taking into account the factor 'generation in the place of residence') and $F(1.863) = 15.19$, $p < 0.001$ (analysis of the influence of generation in the region), and it had some influence on interest in the roots in Poland, $F(2.1251) = 5.81$, $p < 0.001$ (analysis taking into account the influence of generation in the region). In the case of the variable of knowledge about the roots, a significant region effect was obtained in Ukraine, $F(1.879) = 6.55$, $p < 0.01$ (analysis of the influence of generation in the place of residence) and in Poland, $F(2.1251) = 13.12$, $p < 0.001$ (analysis of the influence of generation in the region). The conclusion is that the

residents of the western and northern regions express a weaker interest and have a lesser knowledge about their roots than the residents of (especially) Galicia for more reasons than just the 'new' generation they represent. This can also be said about the inhabitants of eastern Ukraine as compared with western Ukraine.

In addition to the significance of the generation, we tested the influence of the urbanisation rate on the two indicators concerning the respondents' roots. In the Polish sample, even though the factor of the size of place almost entirely obliterated the region effect for the variable of interest in the roots (the rural residents declared the greatest interest, and in doing so they markedly differed from the other three types of place where there were no such differences), it did not eliminate the impact of the region on the respondents' knowledge about their roots (Table 6). In the Ukrainian sample, the region effect was maintained for both interest in the regions and knowledge about them (Table 6).

The place where one lives also includes people whom one meets on a daily basis, and those who live next door – one's neighbours. Weaker neighbour relations could be observed among the residents of the western regions than among the residents of the eastern regions and Galicia, where there were no visible differences (Table 4), and in western Ukraine than eastern Ukraine (Table 5). As in the case of the attachment to place and interest in the roots, the inhabitants of the western and northern regions in Poland, and of eastern Ukraine, were characterised by a smaller degree of 'social rootedness' in the current place of residence than the residents of the eastern and south-eastern voivodeships of Poland and western Ukraine. As in the case of attachment to place, the strength of neighbour relations was dependent on the region's urbanisation rate: higher urbanisation rate levels are usually associated with the weakening of local relations with neighbours and replacing them with looser and less obliging professional and social relations. Therefore, similarly to the remaining variables, the factor of the size of place was included into the analysis. We did indeed find out that in the Polish sample the size of place totally eliminated the region effect (Table 6). In the Ukrainian sample, despite the significant effect of the size of place, the region effect could still be observed (Table 6), so as a significant interaction between the region and the size of place, $F(3.894) = 18.95$, $p < 0.001$, which could be explained by the fact that the residents of middle-sized cities (up to 200,000) had the strongest neighbour relations in western Ukraine, and the weakest in eastern Ukraine. Eastern Ukraine also proved more diversified than western Ukraine: whereas in the former all cities had significantly lower results than rural areas, these values in western Ukraine were on a more balanced level, and neighbour relations in cities, mainly small and medium-sized ones, were similar to those in villages.

Declared self-identification, involving the categories of the place of residence and region of the country, was the last measure of local identity used in the study. In both samples, significant region effects were found: in Poland – in line with the other results – the inhabitants of the western and northern regions declared a weaker degree of self-identification in terms of the place of residence

than the inhabitants of eastern and south-eastern Poland, even though there were no major differences between the two in terms of regional identification (Table 2). On the other hand, in the Ukrainian sample, the inhabitants of eastern Ukraine more frequently declared their self-identification in terms of place and region than the residents of western Ukraine (Table 3).

The results obtained in Ukraine stand in contradiction to the earlier findings which suggested a lower degree of local identification and psychological rootedness in eastern rather than western Ukraine, even though they conform to a widely held opinion (though not always supported by research findings – cf. Czernysz 2003) that it is the direct vicinity (place of residence, region), and not the country at large, which is the actual frame of reference in eastern Ukraine, whereas national identity is the prevalent one in the west of the country. It was the sentiments of the residents of eastern Ukraine, as opposed to the national attitudes, that the former Ukrainian Prime Minister and would be president, Viktor Yanukovich, appealed to when he set up his ‘Regions’ party.

Similarly as in the case of attachment to place, we tested the potential impact of the size of place (irrespective of the region) on the declared self-identification in terms of place and region of the country. In the Polish sample, self-identification by place did not depend on its size, while in the Ukrainian sample, there were substantial differences in eastern and western Ukraine alike: urban dwellers more frequently than village dwellers felt more identification with their place of residence; in eastern Ukraine this was true for all cities, $(3.450) = 11.801$, $p < 0.01$, and in western Ukraine – for the largest and second largest cities, $(3.450) = 10.055$, $p < 0.05$.

A reverse pattern was revealed in the case of regional identification, in both Polish and Ukrainian samples, residents of rural areas (or small towns) declared themselves more frequently as ‘inhabitants of their region’ than city dwellers: $(3.601) = 10.02$, $p < 0.05$ (western and northern regions), $(3.370) = 10.738$, $p < 0.05$ (Eastern Poland), $(3.357) = 22.657$, $p < 0.001$ (Galicia), $(3.450) = 8.49$, $p < 0.05$ (western Ukraine), $(3.450) = 9.50$, $p < 0.05$ (eastern Ukraine).

Regional disparities between Poland and Ukraine in terms of national identity

Such issues as the attitude to the national question, feeling of attachment to one’s country and national self-identification, as well as attitudes to other nations clearly distinguished the surveyed regions, mainly in Ukraine (Tables 3 and 5), and, to a lesser extent, in Poland (Tables 2 and 4). The residents of the western and northern regions declared a much lesser attachment to the country than those of Galicia, while the inhabitants of Eastern Poland were somewhere in between the other two regions (Table 4). Similar differences (with an anticipated vector) were noted in the Ukrainian sample: the residents of eastern Ukraine declared a significantly lower attachment to their country than the residents of western Ukraine (Table 5).

As regards nationalistic feelings (pride of one's nation and conviction about its nobleness), the western and northern regions had lower values than Eastern Poland, and Eastern Poland had these values lower than Galicia (Table 4), whereas eastern Ukraine had significantly lower values than western Ukraine (Table 5).

In case of self-identification, inhabitants of the western and northern regions definitely less frequently listed the nation as the object of self-identification than residents of the eastern and south-eastern regions, and they much more frequently identified themselves with Europe (Europeans) and the world (citizens of the world) (Table 2). The inhabitants of eastern Ukraine considerably less frequently listed their own nation (identification as 'Ukrainians') than the inhabitants of western Ukraine (Table 3), and this could be observed for all residents of both regions and also those who declared Ukrainian nationality (in the latter case, 69.3% of Ukrainian inhabitants of eastern Ukraine as compared with 92.1% of Ukrainian inhabitants of western Ukraine defined their object of self-identification as 'being a Ukrainian', $(1,367) = 30,278$, $p < 0,001$).

What differed eastern Ukraine from the Polish western and northern regions was their significantly *lower* self-identification as 'Europeans' and 'citizens of the world' than in western Ukraine (Table 3). In western Ukraine, national and supra-national (European, cosmopolitan) self-identification exists side by side. However, additional analyses showed that in this region self-identification as 'being a Ukrainian' was – similarly to Poland – negatively correlated with self-identification as 'being a European', $(1,450) = 5.22$, $p < 0.05$, and a 'citizen of the world', $(1,450) = 6.07$, $p < 0.05$. This suggests that western Ukraine is not a monolithic region: in addition to citizens with a strong sense of national identification (who definitely make up a majority) there are citizens who identify themselves in expressly non-nationalistic terms, but in European and cosmopolitan categories instead.

The final criterion used in the comparisons was the evaluation of mutually inflicted injustices and debts of gratitude owed by, and to, the respondents' own nation and ten other nations. The comparison of relevant mean values revealed serious regional disparities in all the four categories (opinion on injustices inflicted by others, injustices inflicted to others, debts of gratitude to and from other nations). In Poland, the lowest values in all the four categories were noted among the residents of the eastern regions, whereby they distinctly differed from the residents of the western and northern regions and Galicia, who did not show any real differences between them (Table 4). A similar direction of differences could be observed in Ukraine: the inhabitants of eastern Ukraine scored significantly lower in all the criteria than the inhabitants of western Ukraine (Table 5). We can say therefore that the inhabitants of the eastern parts of both countries felt less 'wronged' throughout history by other nations and were less convinced that others owe something to them; but that they also were of the opinion that in the past Poles/Ukrainians inflicted less injustices on others and

that they owe less to others. This suggests a more neutral and less polarised attitudes to the national issues in these particular regions.

In order to test how far this result could be shaped by the number of answers in the middle of the scale – which would point to the indecisiveness of the respondents coming from those regions rather than to their different beliefs – all the results from the 7-point scale were recoded for all the four criteria, and within them – for the 10 selected nationalities, and the number of positive answers ('definitely yes', 'rather yes'), negative answers ('definitely no', 'rather no') and neutral answers ('difficult to say' and 'neither yes, nor no') were counted. The comparison of the three Polish regions showed that the lower scores in Eastern Poland were mainly influenced by significant differences in the number of negative answers in all the four categories, $F(2.1327) = 12.05$, $p < 0.001$ for a sense of being wronged, $F(2.1327) = 18.64$, $p < 0.001$ for inflicting injustices on others, $F(2.1327) = 12.24$, $p < 0.001$ for a feeling of gratitude towards other nations, and $F(2.1327) = 12.24$ for the conviction that other nations should feel grateful. On the other hand, the Ukrainian regions differed from each other by all the aforementioned criteria: eastern Ukrainians provided significantly more negative answers and significantly less neutral and positive answers in respect of all the four comparison criteria. This in turn suggests disparate opinions (lesser importance attached to national issues?) rather than inability to provide an answer were responsible for the obtained results.

In addition to the above, additional variance analyses were performed for all the measures of national identity. Besides the regional factor, they also involved the factor of the size of place. In the Polish sample, this factor, although significant in every single case, proved a worse predictor of national identity than regional differentiation (Table 6). Even stronger regional effects were obtained for most of the measures in the Ukrainian sample (Table 6), especially with regard to such criteria as nationalistic persuasion, sense of national injustice and conviction that other nations owe a great deal to Ukrainians.

Conservatism–liberalism

In line with all data on the regional differentiation of political ideologies (Bartkowski 2003; Zarycki 1997, 2000, 2002), the results of this study also indicate that conservative views are significantly more common among the inhabitants of eastern and south-eastern Poland than among the residents of the western and northern parts of the country (Table 4) and they can only partly be attributed to disparities in the urbanisation rates of the two regions (Table 6). Similar results, also corroborating the existing body of knowledge, were obtained in Ukraine: the inhabitants of western Ukraine held more conservative views than the inhabitants of eastern Ukraine (Table 5) and – similarly to Poland – the regional effect did not entirely obliterate the significant effect of the urbanisation rate (cf. Table 6).

Internal regional disparities – a summary

According to expectations, the inhabitants of the western and northern parts of Poland were characterised by a significantly lower objective rootedness concerning the place of residence than the residents of the eastern and south-eastern regions, which was associated by a distinctly lower level of ‘subjective’ rootedness: declared attachment to place, self-identification in terms of place, and higher – in declared European and cosmopolitan self-identification, a significantly lower level of interest in the family history and history of the place of residence, weaker neighbour relations and a lower level of conservative views. Inhabitants of the western and northern regions had also a slightly higher level of cultural capital than (particularly) inhabitants of Eastern Poland. These results largely corroborate the existing body of knowledge about the ‘mentality’ differences between Polish regions (Bartkowski 2003). These differences can partly be explained by dissimilar urbanisation rates; this factor had an enormous influence (so much as to eliminate the regional effect) on cultural capital differentiation, length of stay in the present region of residence, the strength of local neighbourly ties as well as interest in the family and local history. In the remaining cases, the region effect could still be observed despite the effect of the size of place, which was also significant, and which turned out to be even higher in the case of conservative views.

Some meaningful results concerning regional disparities were obtained in the category of national attitudes. Even though the inhabitants of two eastern voivodeships of the former Congress Kingdom declared a stronger national and weaker European self-identification than the inhabitants of the western and northern regions and were ranked somewhere between the strongly nationalistic Galicia and the least nationalistic western regions in terms of declared national pride and conviction about the noble behaviours of Poles throughout history, they expressed significantly weaker views about various ‘historical events bearing upon the present’, both negative and positive, concerning Poland and ten other nations. In this, they resembled the inhabitants of eastern Ukraine, for whom national issues were clearly of lesser importance than for the inhabitants of eastern Galicia and Volyn, i.e. the regions neighbouring with Poland. It should also be emphasised that the regional effects in terms of national attitudes were much stronger than the effects of the size of the place of residence.

Similarly to Poland, the overall vectors of regional disparities in Ukraine conformed to the expectations (stronger conservatism and nationalism in the western oblasts). However, contrary to popular belief that local identity is the main form of identity in eastern Ukraine, the picture which emerges from this study seems much more complicated. Although the inhabitants of the eastern oblasts did indeed more frequently choose their own place and region, as well as Eastern Europe as their main object of self-identification, the expressly declared attachment to the place of residence (neighbourhood, town/village) was weaker than among the inhabitants of the western oblasts, so as local neighbourly

ties. The unpublished data from the same research project (Lewicka, Foland 2005), compiled using cartographic techniques, indicate that the residents of the eastern oblasts show a weaker territorial identity, measured by the degree of interpersonal consent to their region of residence being an object of positive reference as compared with the western oblasts. Western Ukrainians were also in a much greater concord as to the areas of the country they rejected (i.e. indicated as negative ones). It could be concluded therefore that the selection of the place and the region as the main self-identification objects could be dictated not so much by a high level of local identity but a limited cafeteria of answers, as a result of which the respondents, who did not want to opt for national identification on the one hand, nor for European or cosmopolitan on the other, chose whatever was 'left'. Such a conclusion is corroborated by the aforementioned studies by Czernysz (2003): given a longer and less 'territorially oriented' list of possibilities, the residents of Donetsk, a model city of eastern Ukraine, eagerly went for it, and selected such categories as gender, age or profession, whereas the residents of Lviv preferred nation-related categories.


Poland–Ukraine: similarities and differences

The above analyses corroborate the anticipated directions of regional disparities in Poland and Ukraine. However, the mere fact that (for example) western Ukrainians proved to be more nationalistic than their compatriots from the east of the country, and Poles inhabiting the eastern and south-eastern regions were found more nationalistic than Poles living in the northern and western parts, does not necessarily imply that the residents of the areas divided by Poland's eastern border will share similar characteristics. What is plausible is that the nationalism of western Ukraine, when aggregated, could be similar (or even weaker) than that of an otherwise less nationalistic western Poland. The vector of disparities may be the same, but the overall figures may be different.

The last stage of the analysis was the comparison of all the five regions in terms of the criteria which were uniform for both countries (Table 1). This was done by grouping the variables into several thematic categories (for their more detailed description see the section on Method), which was followed by a hierarchical cluster analysis. The factors taken into account were: degree of regional 'modernisation', degree of objective rootedness in the place of residence, two cultural capital indicators, local and national identity indicators, as well as the level of conservatism vs. liberalism of opinion. The final analysis was carried out jointly on all the indicators. The results were shown in the form of dendrograms (Table 7, pp. 31–32), where the distance measure was the physical proximity of two elements: the closer they are linked and at the closer level, the greater their similarity. Two final comparisons were made jointly for all the indicators, except that in the last one the factor of 'generation in the place and in the region' was eliminated because it artificially understated the similarity between the three Polish regions.

Table 7. Similarities and differences between three regions of Poland and three regions of Ukraine – results of hierarchical cluster analysis

Variables	Indicators	Structure of similarities
Region 'modernisation':	percentage living in cities over 200,000; percentage living in rural areas; number of household members	<p>2 Western and Northern Territories 4 Eastern regions 3 Eastern Ukraine 1 Polish Galicia 5 WNT</p>
Cultural capital:	respondent's education; parents' education; number of books at home; number of books at parents' home	<p>2 Eastern regions 4 Eastern Ukraine 3 Polish Galicia 1 WNT 5 Western Ukraine</p>
Objective rootedness:	Length of stay in the neighbourhood; town/village; voivodeship/oblast; percentage of new arrivals and of third generation in the place of residence and in the region	<p>2 Eastern regions 5 Western Ukraine 3 Polish Galicia 4 Eastern Ukraine 1 WNT</p>
National self-identification	Local identity: Identification with neighbourhood, place of residence; self-identification in terms of place, region; interest in the roots, neighbours; interest in the roots	<p>2 Eastern regions 3 Polish Galicia 4 Eastern Ukraine 1 WNT 5 Western Ukraine</p>
National identity:	Attachment to the country; pride and nobleness of the country; mutual injustices and debts of gratitude relating to own nation and other nationalities	<p>2 Eastern regions 3 Polish Galicia 1 WNT 4 Eastern Ukraine 5 Western Ukraine</p>



As we can see, in four out of six detailed comparisons and in two summary comparisons two regions of Poland's east: the eastern voivodeships and Galicia, were found the most similar. At the same time, eastern Ukraine proved to be the most idiosyncratic region in the exercise, poles apart from the other regions. Expectations that western Ukraine is 'closer' to eastern or southern Poland than to the eastern reaches of the country were confirmed: this region showed the most similarities to Eastern Poland and Galicia relating to the (small) regional modernisation, to Eastern Poland relating to (low) cultural capital, and to Galicia relating to (substantial) objective rootedness of their inhabitants. Slightly lower, but also clear similarities were manifested by the residents of western Ukraine as compared to both regions of Eastern Poland relating to (strong) local identity. The two summary analyses also placed western Ukraine in direct vicinity to Eastern Poland and Galicia. In all these comparisons, the eastern part of Poland, Polish Galicia and western Ukraine created a consistent strand, different from the western and northern regions of Poland, not to mention eastern Ukraine.

According to the expectations, Poland turned out to be more homogenous than Ukraine; only in terms of cultural capital Polish western and northern regions showed more similarities to eastern Ukraine, and in terms of conservatism of opinion – to western Ukraine than to the two other Polish regions. The latter result shows that the Ukrainians living in both regions are on average less conservative than Poles. The survey also indicates that in general terms they are less nationalistic. As regards national attitudes, Poland emerged as a country with an exceptional degree of homogeneity. And even though in this respect western Ukrainians are closer to Poles than to the eastern regions of their country, the intensity of nationalistic persuasion proved greater in the whole of Poland than in Ukraine.

Summary

The survey discussed in this paper is the first research project known to me which set out to analyse, in a systematic way and using representative samples, the 'mentality differences' of the neighbouring regions of Poland and Ukraine. In addition to demographic and macro-social criteria, the paper focused on a selected group of variables related to the sense of identity of the residents of the surveyed regions and the overall level of conservatism, that is, issues which could most strongly be affected by the historical and political past of the regions in question. According to expectations, this common past was reflected in the distance measures used: the inhabitants of the neighbouring regions of western Ukraine and Eastern Poland and Galicia turned out to be more similar in respect of various identity criteria than to the residents of the other regions of their countries (western and northern parts of Poland and eastern Ukraine).

This similarity, however, does not have to extend to other comparison criteria. The remaining surveyed variables, equally interesting from the perspective of researchers studying regional disparities, which refer to attitudes and

behaviours underpinned by the current political and social realities such as life satisfaction and sense of injustice, demandingness and expectations vis à vis the authorities, forms of civic and political activity, acceptable criteria of justice, systems of values and life goals or the level of social trust, were left out from the analysis. It could be surmised that at least with regard to some of these criteria similarities between the neighbouring regions of Poland and Ukraine are found to be smaller than those within the two countries. These comparisons will be tackled in a separate study.

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