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REPLACEMENT MIGRATION AND THE DILEMMAS OF MIGRATION POLICY¹

The notion of *replacement migration* is frequently used in recent literature on migration policy and demographic forecasts. Such migration streams could theoretically compensate for the natural decrease and population ageing, observed in most of developed countries.

In the long run, however, international migration can only slow down, rather than reverse these processes. In this respect, the situation in Poland is unique as its migration balance will most likely remain negative until around 2020. Nevertheless, the population outflow abroad could to some extent be offset by the population inflow. This would require, among other conditions, a reformulation of Poland's migration policy, with an increase of provisions enabling selective legal immigration, preventing at the same time the so-called irregular immigration. Such provisions are already being implemented in some EU countries (including Germany), and in the future will probably form the basis of EU migration policy.

Introduction

The future direction of migration processes is one of the issues widely debated in connection with Poland's EU accession, with many divergent views and forecast expressed on the subject. Numerous surveys are carried out to show the size and structure of migration from Poland, and the share of settlement migration, that is, emigration. The questions directed to students, pupils and young people are as a rule very general in character and communicate intentions rather than their specific contexts, and do not produce information which would be sufficient to formulate reliable opinions concerning the scale of future migration. Nonetheless, recent surveys point to an invariably significant migration potential of Poland's population, most probably showing an increasing tendency as compared to the 1990s.²

The changes in Poland's demographic situation, such as a drastic fall in the fertility rate, resulting in the reduction of the number of births to that of deaths despite a decrease in the death rate and much higher life expectancy values do not seem to enhance such a tendency. Since 1999, an overall decrease in the

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² It should be noted that this statement applies to migration abroad, and not to internal migration, the volume of which – against all expectations – is significantly falling.

total number of the population has been observed. A similar situation was noted in the years 1989–90, and was a consequence of a massive population outflow abroad.³ This, however, was not revealed in the current statistics, but was partly disclosed in the National Census of 2002, which showed that the actual population of Poland was several hundred thousand lower than estimated.

The prospect of the reduction and ageing of the population following the changes in the vital statistics, encourages demographers and policy makers to look at international migration as a factor which might either accelerate or neutralise this process. In Poland, these issues were discussed at the 1st Demographic Congress in 2002 and later by the Government Population Council and the Government Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS).⁴ This coincided with the publication of a report on *replacement migration* by the Population Division at the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN. This controversial report provoked an animated and wide-ranging discussion among specialists in this field. It was discussed in ‘*Studia Demograficzne*’ by Orzechowska (2002) and reviewed by Kotowska (2003), mainly from the perspective of anticipated changes in the labour market, in a study published by the Council of Europe. The issue of *replacement migration* is also the topic of a research project started in 2003 by the European Forum for Migration Research, a joint initiative undertaken by the Institute of Geography and Spatial Organisation of the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN), Swiss Foundation *Stiftung für Bevölkerung, Migration und Umwelt* and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).⁵

The UN Population Division Report (United Nations 2000), and the ensuing discussion highlight the processes and dilemmas which are important elements in the formulation of long term migration policies both by individual countries and international organisations. Demographic trends observable in Poland render this report and the debate surrounding it a very pertinent issue. Until several years ago, it was commonly agreed that Poland’s demographic situation was distinctly different from the situation in most European countries. Such an opinion was mainly due to the birth boom of the 1980s, which was supposedly to ensure further – at least moderately positive – dynamics of population changes. This opinion underpinned a series of (already outdated) demographic forecasts prepared by the Central Statistical Office (GUS) in the 1990s and by the Committee on Demographic Studies at PAN. Today’s reading of the UN

³ The direct reason for this wave of emigration was the abandonment of passport restrictions in 1988 and realisation by the Polish society that the period when it was relatively easy to acquire the status of ‘late settler’ (*Aussiedler*), and asylum-seeker in other Western countries, was coming to an end.

⁴ An earlier version of this study, commissioned by RCSS, was published in the *EUROPA XXI* newsletter (No. 10, 2003), issued by the Institute of Geography and Spatial Organisation at PAN.

⁵ I would like to extend my thanks to Marek Kupiszewski, PhD, heading the Forum, and to Katarzyna Sączuk, MA, for allowing access to many materials on *replacement migration*, including a general study by Sączuk (2003), which I was able to use only in part.

report and other works inspired by it leaves no doubt that its findings relate to Poland no less than to countries where population ageing processes and their social and economic implications have manifested themselves much earlier.

Replacement migration and its dimensions

Replacement migration is a new term pertaining to a well-known concept. In view of falling birth rate values and constantly increasing life expectancy values, demographers were making attempts to calculate theoretical volumes of migration inflows which would neutralise future population decrease and changes in the age structure. For instance Ahlbury (1992) outlined the implications of different variants of changes in the migration levels and death rate values for the values of the old age dependency ratio in the United States.

Maintaining those values at a level close to the initial one in the period 1987–2080, with the assumed constant value of the fertility level at 1,840 and an invariable level of the observable death rate, would require a gradual increase in the net migration inflow to the United States from 800 000 in 1987 to 4 000 000 in 2080, and would result in nearly doubling the US population in the discussed period. At the same time, with a simultaneous reduction in death rate levels this inflow would have to be considerably higher. Vossen (1992) analysed the values of the demographic pressure index (which he constructed) for the Netherlands. In the numerator, the index showed public expenditure per capita aggregated for five-year age cohorts, and in the denominator – the number of the employed, disaggregated by age cohorts. In his calculations, Vossen assumed different volumes of migration inflow, different age structures of migrants and a gradual convergence of their (and their descendants') fertility rates, and concluded that the favourable impact of immigration on the demographic pressure index values falls as the volume of immigration rises. Increased economic activity of the population has proved a more effective tool in this respect.

As compared to Vossen's work, the UN report is based on relatively simplistic assumptions. Starting off with the most recent demographic forecasts until 2050 (their median values), the report provides answers to the following three questions: (a) at what net immigration value the overall population would stabilise at the initial level; (b) what volume of immigration would ensure stabilisation of the current working age population (15–64 age brackets), and (c) what volume of immigration would be needed to ensure stabilisation of the quotient of the working age population to the population aged 65 or older. Such projections were also made for eight countries: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, South Korea, Russia and the United States, for the European Union (15 Member States) and for the whole Europe (47 countries).

According to the findings of the first projection series, the theoretical volume of immigration turned out to be smaller than the one observed in the United States, France and Great Britain, and much higher than the one currently noted

in Japan, South Korea and Italy. The second projection series revealed that only the United States were currently receiving larger immigration flows than it would be necessary to stabilise the number of the working age population, while in the remaining countries, Europe and the EU this would mean a substantial migration increase.

Finally, the third projection series revealed absurdly high immigration volumes, ranging from 10.8 million per year in the US and 9.7 million in Japan to 93.6 million in South Korea.

The latter case is extremely instructive with regard to Poland since it involves a country whose population, relatively very young, is bound to experience rapid ageing processes manifested both in the upper and lower brackets of the age pyramid. The zero-migration forecast indicates that in South Korea the ratio of the population aged 15–64 to the population aged 65 + is estimated at 2.4 in 2050, as compared to 10.7 in 2000.

The major source of controversy in the reception of the report is the approach to demographic processes observable in countries with strong economies which sees them as *problems*, that is, negative phenomena which call for some action. Some of the reviewers interpreted the projection findings which emphasized the role of international migration as proposals or even recommendations concerning demographic policy (cf. Coleman 2001) – to stimulate and fully open to immigration. However, the authors of the report objected to such an interpretation and pointed out that their calculations were hypothetical projections, and not forecasts.

The report and the wide-ranging discussion on *replacement migration* led to the formulation of certain general views, which to some extent departed from the opinions prevailing in Europe and North America in the early 1990s.

Firstly, the secular process of population ageing along with its many consequences was accepted as an irreversible phenomenon. The tenets of the *second demographic transition* (van de Kaa 1987) were directly or indirectly accepted. Coleman (2001) wrote that nothing could bring back the age structure which characterised the society in the past. We have to reconcile ourselves to an absolute reduction in the number of the population both in individual countries and continents. According to some authors, this reduction could bring some positive effects, mainly connected with easing the demographic pressure on the natural environment and natural resources. This standpoint, however, carries an underlying conviction that long term demographic trends can be reversed and population ageing can be decelerated, with a limited scale of changes expected to take place in the coming 15 to 20 years.

Secondly, international migration cannot compensate for the falling fertility rates and population ageing – it can only slow down these processes, to a limited extent. *Replacement migration* would have to assume the form of continuous streams increasing in time (the populations of immigrants and their descendants are also subject to ageing processes as a result of gradual accommodation of their fecundity rates to the values typical of the host societies),

reaching, after several decades, huge values. This would result in a fast replacement of the entire population of the host countries. For instance, in 2050 in Italy, foreigners and their descendants would account for 29 per cent of the total population according to projection series (a) of the UN report, 39 per cent according to projection series (b) and 79 per cent according to projection series (c), with the total population of Italy reaching 194 million in the latter case. Migration inflows on such a scale would probably be higher than the demographic potential of the source countries, apart from other factors – cultural, geopolitical, ecological, etc. The UN report has proved the weakness of international migration as a stabilising factor for the age structure of the population. Indirectly, it undermined the arguments in favour of active migration policy and supported the arguments of the opponents of such a policy.

Thirdly, partly as an indirect implication of rejecting the concept of *replacement migration*, a sceptical yet pragmatic attitude towards international migration seems to be evolving in Western European countries. Generally speaking, its evolution is underpinned by the negative experiences of the 1980s and the early 1990s, when a marked increase in the immigration to Western Europe could be observed, both from the Third World countries and the Central and Eastern Europe. The official reasons for this wave of migration were political, though in fact it was mainly driven by economic factors. Coleman (2001) who is an authority on this subject, summarised it as follows: ‘Europe has already experienced one mass migration episode (...), which however failed to prevent population ageing, and while some of its aspects are positively evaluated in economic terms, the overall implications are not positive, both for immigrants and host societies. There is a difference of opinion concerning the possibility of integration and assimilation of the growing populations of immigrants, foreigners and their children. Some of these groups have been successful, whereas others have been marginalised, and experience blatant discrimination and poverty, and in the case of the younger generation – delayed educational advancement and high susceptibility to crime. Analyses should be aimed to resolve these doubts and should precede all discussion about the possibilities of increasing immigration.’

At the same time, largely under the influence of the private sector of the economy and its interests, policy makers and experts – economists and demographers in Western European countries opt for opening the channels for legal migration to work to people with education and qualifications that are either currently needed or will be in demand in the future. This is the pragmatic aspect of migration policy which is not aimed to attract large migration flows but to encourage selective migration, to match the present and future needs of the labour market. Such an inflow would be too small, however, to decelerate changes in the demographic structure of the host countries in any significant way. Its major aim is to sustain the competitiveness of their national economies on the global scale. Thus, it can be said that this is a fusion of economic motives as seen by potential immigrants and by the societies receiving them.

At the same time, the traditional concept of *brain drain* is no longer used. Moreover, legal migration to work would result in a reduction of illegal immigration. It is pointed out that the level of unemployment among the new arrivals who either immigrated illegally or as refugees is several times higher than the average in a given country, while the level of economic activity, mainly among women, is low. Legal migration should also lead to an effective integration of newcomers with the host societies. The future inflow of the population from the new EU member states, estimated at 150 000 per year, is considered as an important element of such a legal migratory flow (Fotakis 2000).

Fourthly, increased old age dependency ratios (proportion BP of the population above 65 years of age relative to the population aged 15 to 64 years) and the resulting dangers for the social security system, and – in a longer perspective – for maintaining the standard of living of the currently wealthy societies can be eased by immigration only to some degree and on a temporary basis. The major challenge is to increase the number of the working population in the total population, which means that the economic dependency ratio has to be taken into account (cf. Vossen 1992). In the case of European countries, its values can be considerably improved (that is, reduced) through a reduction in the unemployment level and an increase in the economic activity level (mainly among women, because only 50 per cent in the 15–64 age brackets are employed across the EU, as compared to 70 per cent in the US), and raising the retirement age, ultimately up to 70–72 years of age. The employment reserves in the EU countries are currently estimated at 48 million (Fotakis 2000). This is the number of people seeking work and a theoretical number by which employment would grow in a situation when the economic activity rate in the European Union would reach the level noted in the United States.

Nonetheless, both experts and policy makers realise that the reserves, however vast, are not inexhaustible and their use (which is not necessarily easy) can only postpone the inevitable crisis arising from the ageing of the population. That is why they not only see the need for changing the framework on which pensions funds are built and for limiting the social security systems funded from the public budget, but also for fundamental changes in the current relations between production, consumption and accumulation.

Fifthly, the macroeconomic projections made in the recent years, intended to analyse the consequences of population ageing, do not seem to corroborate these alarmist predictions, according to which this process is bound to lead the global economic powers of today to bankruptcy in several decades. For example, the findings from a research project carried out in 2000–2003 by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Austria (cf. *Population Ageing, Pensions and Health* 2003) concerning Japan indicate that the demographic changes (the research covered the years 1950–2050) will lead to a per capita GDP reduction by one third per annum in the period 2000–2040, and the unfavourable demographic trends do not have to be seen as major threat

facing Japan's economy. Such projections take into account the shifts in the relations between income levels of the working age population and those of the post-working age population, and increased fiscal burdens connected with pensions and health insurance.

In this context, the example of Japan is extremely interesting for a number of reasons. This is a country where the reduction of both the fertility rate and the death rate was a very dynamic process over the last 50 years. With a total population increase in this period from 87 to 127 million, the number of children aged 0 to 4 years decreased by nearly 5 million, while the number of the population aged 75 or older grew by 7 million. The population ageing processes accelerated after the main phase of economic expansion had been completed. Regardless of the future development in Japan's economic situation, it does not seem very likely at this moment that the Japanese society would accept liberalisation of the current, very restrictive, regulations concerning immigration.

In view of the above, the conclusion and recommendation for social and economic policy presented in the UN report seems particularly pertinent, that in order to maintain a relative balance in the system of intergenerational transfers, it is more expedient to increase the economic activity of women (even though this might contribute to a further decline of the fertility rate) rather than to raise the retirement age. Interestingly – as was demonstrated in recent conflicts and public debates in such European countries as France or Austria – well-off societies are more willing to accept the prospect of reducing pensions than prolonging the period of work required for the acquisition of pension rights.

The above characteristic of the concept of *replacement migration*, and particularly the discussion it has provoked, leads to a number of pertinent conclusions for Poland's migration policy. Before we discuss them in greater detail, we will briefly outline the main trends concerning the volumes and directions of migratory flows and their probable changes following Poland's accession to the European Union.

Migration after Poland's accession to the European Union

This issue attracted a lot of attention, especially in the period of negotiating the terms and conditions of accession. Studies on this topic were published both in Poland (cf. Korcelli 1998), and in EU countries.

In the 1980s, Poland generated a huge wave of emigration to Western European countries and North America (mainly Germany and the United States), estimated at over one million people (cf. Okólski 1994). Only the migratory outflow from the former Soviet Union countries reached a similar size. The 1990s saw a distinct fall in the permanent (or settlement) migration, estimated at 50 000 per annum, i.e. about two and a half times as high as shown in the official statistics (Okólski, Stola 1998). At the same time, the

scale of temporary and shuttle migration considerably increased. Due to the fact that a large part of such migration is not registered and is connected with work in the 'black economy' sector, there is a difference of opinion as to its scale and structure. This category of migration is inherently correlated with settlement migration, because a certain percentage of those who go to another country to work, estimated at 5 to 10 per cent, settles abroad for good. Knowledge about this type of migration has in recent years been considerably expanded owing to case studies supervised by Professor Marek Okólski.

As far as migratory changes during EU membership are concerned, Polish and foreign (mainly Austrian and German) experts markedly differ in their opinions. While the latter as a rule see Poland's migratory potential as still high, the former see it as moderate and falling.⁶ These opinions take into account economic (differences in pay and unemployment levels), demographic (especially the size of the population cohorts aged 18–29) and sociological (network of contacts in the host countries) factors, as well as migration policies in the host countries.

A study prepared for the conference organised by *Institut für den Donaauraum und Mitteleuropa*, which was held in Vienna in February 2000, outlines a succinct scenario for a likely evolution of migration processes (cf. Korcelli 2000). According to this scenario, legal (so-called regular) migration from Poland connected with seeking employment and other reasons (including family) would only moderately increase after 2004, while irregular migration is not expected to undergo any substantial changes in the initial period following accession. Both regular and irregular migration will gradually shrink after the expiry of protection clauses forbidding legal employment Polish nationals, that is, after 2010. As regards legal migration, its initial increase is going to be small, and its scale should be stabilised owing to the widespread awareness that the borders of EU countries would open for good. After several years, a migration hump should be felt, reflecting, on the one hand, the result of legalising their stay by those who have resided for years in a given country, and on the other – a better penetration of foreign labour markets by individuals with high and relatively high vocational qualifications. At the same time, following a temporary slump in the level of migration, it should stabilise for a longer period, as a result of the progressing integration of Poland's economy with the EU economy and the attracting force of Polish communities and people with Polish origin living abroad, encouraging new migrants. We can expect therefore that, in the trajectory of changes concerning the intensity of migration with Poland, fluctuations will be observed rather than any consistent trend. It can be anticipated that an average migration outflow will be higher than the one currently observed, but much lower than that in the 1980s, when it exceeded the level of 200 000 per annum. As we can see, this will not be migration on a mass scale.

⁶ A detailed, critical analysis of several forecasts prepared in Germany and Austria in the years 1997–2000 was made by Kupiszewski (2001).

In the light of most recent tendencies – growing pessimistic attitudes among the society as a result of the non-fulfilment of expectations connected with political and economic transformation, particularly negative changes in the labour market – the forecasts for a period lasting several years, or even for longer than ten years following Poland's EU accession should be reviewed (upwards) as compared to the forecasts from the years 1998–2000, a period when accession negotiations concerning the free flow of people were under way. Currently, an estimated outflow of 70 000 – 80 000 per annum is anticipated (excluding temporary and shuttle migration). This would correspond to a forecast of the European Commission, quoted by Fotakis (2000), with a rather conservative assumption that the migration from Poland would account for approximately a half of the overall migratory flow of population from the new to the old EU member states. Naturally, such forecasts are fraught with the risk of considerable error.

Forecasting the volume and structure of migration inflow is even more difficult. Although immigration to Poland will most likely increase, it should not become a net immigration country in the coming years. In the foreseeable future – the next two decades – the outflow abroad should remain the prevailing direction of migration, for two main reasons. Firstly, the emigration tradition has a long history in Poland. One could even speak of a whole culture of emigration and going to work in the West. As far as modern history is concerned, it is now the third generation of Poles that have learnt to identify emigration with success in life. This is certainly a true and well-publicised experience of many emigrants from the 1980s. Failures, probably more frequent among those who left Poland in the 1990s, seldom see the light of day. Secondly, in the coming decades the gap between the pay level and average standard of living of Polish citizens and the level of the wealthiest EU countries, such as Germany or Denmark, both neighbouring with Poland, is not likely to be considerably reduced. In addition to that, economic development will to a greater extent involve an increase in labour productivity rather than employment increase. For this reason, owing to the specific age structure of the population, the labour market situation in Poland will for a long time to come encourage migration abroad. A question remains why the anticipated migratory flow abroad will not probably be fully compensated by immigration into Poland.

Dilemmas of migration policy

In stabilised and wealthy countries, migration policy mainly focuses on the goals and rules governing the inflow of new arrivals. The reverse situation is in poor and undemocratically governed countries where the authorities focus either on stimulating or preventing immigration. In the period since 1989 until now, the policy focus in Poland has been on the facilitating of migration outflow abroad. In the accession negotiations with the European Union concerning the flow of people and employment, most attention was paid to

achieving conditions which would help reduce the burden on the labour market in Poland and increase the influx of remittances from abroad. Such goals are characteristic of migration policies in underdeveloped countries.

The lack of an active immigration policy and its overriding goal, which Okólski (1998) termed as migration doctrine, is the starting point for the evaluation of both the status quo and the prospects concerning the phenomenon of immigration to Poland. It should be emphasized, however, that possible efforts of the state aimed to support immigration could produce only limited results as far as numbers are concerned. When Poland's international obligations, mainly those arising from EU membership, other external factors and internal constraints are taken into account, it has to be concluded that any settlement migration inflow into Poland of several dozen thousand arrivals per year is not likely in the coming two decades. The following can be regarded as arguments in favour of this thesis.

Poland will mainly serve as a stopover rather than the target country for migration from Asian countries. Like today, such migrants will head for Western European and North American countries. The following, interrelated factors speak in favour of this thesis: (a) differences in the level of economic development: income, housing, diversity and specialisation of business activity – making Poland an unattractive country to migrate to; (b) prevalence of labour supply over demand which is likely to continue in the coming decades; (c) lack of any extensive network of migration contacts – well-established immigrant communities from the earlier years (with the exception of the Vietnamese colony); (d) lack of huge metropolises which traditionally facilitate establishment of migration contacts and 'taking root' by ethnic minorities; and (e) a relatively low level of tolerance for immigrants in local communities in Poland, particularly the lack of understanding for the need to pay allowances and benefits from public funds to some immigrants.

As regards migration from the countries which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the above listed barriers play a much lesser role, as is evinced by quite extensive literature of the subject (cf. e.g. Stola 1998). On the other hand, the restrictions regarding the source areas of migration are quite pertinent. The migration potential of the European countries of the former USSR proved to be much smaller than the estimates from the early 1990s. To some extent, this is due to a sharp demographic crisis in those countries (cf. Eberhardt 2002). A new factor whose significance is likely to increase is the economic expansion of Russia, attracting immigrants from such countries as Ukraine or Belarus. These circumstances apply also to Poland and people of Polish origin living in those countries.

It is very likely therefore that in the case of Poland the immigration pressure will not be vastly increased before 2020, and migration flows will continue in a similar vein as now – shuttle migration and temporary stays, with an increasing share of the latter. This kind of migration will fill in the gaps which will arise, and certain permanent niches in the labour market and business

activity in Poland. Settlement and family immigration, although larger than it has been in the recent years, will remain at a lower level than emigration and will be of little significance in the overall demographic balance of Poland. Re-emigration and possibly repatriation will arguably be a more significant component of immigration.

In light of the above, how should Poland's future migration policy (that is, mainly immigration policy) be formulated? The overriding goal, an equivalent of the migration doctrine, should be to compensate population outflow by inflow, which would guarantee maintaining the human capital stock, which is being depleted (or rather which cannot be suitably multiplied) through the current, and likely to increase in the future, selective migration, mainly the outflow of highly educated young people to the wealthy countries of Europe and North America. At the same time, the goal of migration policy cannot be a mere partial offsetting of the demographic changes, including natural loss and population ageing processes. Mass-scale immigration, far exceeding the volume of emigration, is not realistically possible, nor would it be desirable or politically and socially acceptable, as is proved by the experiences of such countries as France, Germany, Italy or Spain. During this decade and the following one, labour demand and labour supply in Poland should relatively balance. After 2020, social policy could strive to further increase economic activity of the population, for example by changes in the retirement age, and to create conducive conditions for a partial restoration of the fertility rate levels.

The formulation of specific objectives and the identification of relevant migration policy measures should be thoroughly prepared, and their implementation should be preceded by analyses, including simulations of results. The following policy constituents and policy factors should also be taken into account:

- Alleviating (but not too far-fetched liberalisation) quite restrictive present immigration regulations through simplifying procedures concerning family migration; including migration quotas for foreigners with specific qualifications and occupations;
- Extending the geographical coverage of the law on repatriation visas;
- Introducing a system of government, academic and research scholarships and encouraging non-public institutions to fund scholarships: a pool for Poles and people of Polish origin and a separate pool for foreigners, both open in character;
- Facilitating graduates and visiting students to take up work or start economic activity in Poland after they complete their studies or research internships in Poland;
- Simplifying the legalisation process and introducing familiarisation programmes for newcomers, as well as naturalisation of foreigners residing in Poland for a long time.

These assumptions are largely consistent with the recommendations put forward by Okólski (1994), proposals concerning changes in immigration

regulations in individual European countries and tendencies relating to EU common migration policy, which should be formulated before the end of this decade. These proposals mainly involve extending the possibility of legal immigration (from the so-called third countries, that is, from outside the EU), as a measure preventing illegal immigration, which at the moment is the prevailing type of migration.

Conclusions

Replacement migration is a theoretical concept; it cannot be applied in the migration policy pursued by individual countries and cannot underpin the development of measures to solve social and economic problems arising from population ageing. This is true also for Poland. Nonetheless, Poland's immigration policy should aim towards a greater deal of openness. It could strive towards a partial balancing of the migratory flow abroad by immigration, a process which can be observed now and which is very likely to continue in the future. Attaining relatively balanced migration rates will probably be possible as a result of increased immigration and a weakened process of emigration from Poland. The state migration policy should use its best endeavours to attain such a goal by the end of the next decade.

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