Update from 25/07/2024: Parts of this article in the form of literal quotes without providing the source were used in a subsequent article by the same author entitled "Implementation of the partnership principle in the process of implementing regional operational programs in Poland" published in "Opinie i Komentarze Fundacji Rozwoju Demokracji Lokalnej" 3/2023.
The aim of the paper is to examine the level of application of the partnership rule in the process of implementing regional operational programmes (ROP) in Poland in 2014–2019. It has been assumed that the Monitoring Committees (MC) operate as the institutional manifestation of the partnership principle. The scope of comparative analysis includes practical aspects of the functioning of MCs within ROPs in three voivodships: Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Lubuskie and Świętokrzyskie. The analysis focused on five institutional factors: number of Committee meetings in the financial perspective 2014–2020, number of circular voting events, percentage of socio-economic partners in the total number of Committee members, number of working groups within the MCs, as well as the number of meetings of working groups. The research hypothesis adopted in this article assumes that the regulatory activities expressed in the preparation of guidelines for the application of the partnership principle under the regional operational programs in the 2014–2020 financial perspective turned out to be insufficient for disseminating developed partnerships under ROPs.
The subject of the paper is the participation of non-partisan candidates in local elections in Poland after 2002. The analysis of the prevalence of non-partisanship provides information on the political parties’ performance at the local level. The paper presents analyses of electoral data from the local elections held in 2002, 2006, and 2010. We have used various indicators of non-partisanship which demonstrate the performance of non-partisans in municipalities of different size, the domination of non-partisan mayors over other candidates, the strength of their clubs in councils, and the disproportions of political support between them and their committees. The results of the research show that although the share of non-partisans in local authorities is still very high, it has been gradually decreasing since 2002.
The Integrated Regional Operational Programme (IROP) management system in a weak manner prevents possibility of administrative and political corruption. Particularly susceptible to corruption are procedures of choosing projects and new public procurement system. We could list following reasons, why IROP management system is vulnerable to corruption: (1) system is very complicated, (2) division of competences between various public authorities is incorrect, as well as between politicians and civil servants, (3) some institutions are wrongly designed (particularly regional steering committees), (4) blur regulations, for instance not clearly supporting transparency of administrative procedures, (5) lack of special anti-corruption regulations, (6) Polish administrative and political culture. Decision makers preparing a new system for regional programs (2007–2013) should take into consideration conclusions of this paper and revise this system from the point of view of preventing corruption.
In Western Europe, the model of local government has been changing in the previous decades: from a council-committee model to more executive-oriented ones, like the parliamentary and the presidential models. Political leadership lies at the heart of many of the recent institutional reforms of local government. An explicit aim of these reforms has been to strengthen the executive power, and to provide strong, visible and effective leadership. For example, the position of the mayor in Britain and Germany and of the board in the Netherlands has changed. The direct election of mayors is one of the ways to strengthen the political executive. Not all countries are undergoing such kind of transformation. In some of them, changes have been restricted to few municipalities. Others have been relatively immune to this international trend towards institutional reforms.
The authors consider the problem of limited supply of candidates for mayors. Since 2002, most electoral committees in Polish municipalities have only participated in the elections for municipal councils and not for the principal executive office. Between 2002 and 2010, there was also a growing share of municipalities in which only one candidate ran. The logistic regression analysis demonstrates that the electoral committees’ decision whether or not to nominate a candidate is influenced by their size (popularity), as well as the size of the municipality. If there is a dominating committee and competing incumbents, it is less probable that another candidate would run. It is evident that the well-known effect of incumbency advantage works not only during the elections but also before them (when candidates are registered).
The article discusses the functions of the Committee of the Regions with respect to the legislative process and politics of the European Union, as well as to the politics of the Member States. The main assumption of the analysis, based on the deductive method, is that because of the current political situation in Europe, in addition to being a body giving opinions on the law, the Committee of the Regions should have a greater, fundamental role in shaping the future directions of development for the entire European Union. The discussion is set in the context of fiscal federalism theory and one of its elements assuming that a federal structure has a role in mitigating conflicts, as well as referring to the hybrid nature of the contemporary models of development. It is underpinned by the relevant literature, analyses commissioned by the European Commission, materials of the Committee of the Regions, findings of earlier studies, and the so-called impact reports of the Committee of the Regions published from 2014 to 2017.
The article describes a local conflict which arose when the decision on the establishment of the Brzeziny district (powiat) had been waived at the last moment. This resulted in strong protests of the inhabitants, who hoped that the district authorities would be located in Brzeziny. The conflict impaired the local community`s ability to exercise its political function and to execute public tasks. Two opposed groups emerged in the local community: representatives of the local authority and people connected with them on the one hand, and the protest committee, later the Teraz Brzeziny (Time for Brzeziny) association, on the other. The consequence of this local conflict, taken as a model, is mutual adaptation of both opposing sides. In Brzeziny, the adaptation took the form of a compromise negotiations between the government authorities and local community`s representatives, which brought a solution to the problem. As a result of the compromise, the Brzeziny district has been established, however not within the originally planned boundaries.
Regional and local authorities today face a twofold challenge of delivering locally responsive policies in accordance with EU development goals. For this reason they need to align their development strategies with European guidelines. This paper determines the drivers and hindering factors behind the effective involvement of local and regional authorities in drafting and implementing EU policies with territorial impact. It evaluates several examples of multi-level governance operating in the institutional context of the EU and identifies its most important weaknesses such as lack of regional administrative capacities; insufficient Europeanization of subnational elites
and inadequate communication between EU, national and regional levels.
The paper presents the basic consequences of the introduction of single-member districts (the FPTP system) in municipal elections in Poland. The authors analyze the results of the 2010 and 2014 elections (before and after the electoral reform). Basing on the difference-in-differences research scheme, the paper presents changes in the municipalities where either block- -voting or proportional representation systems were replaced by the FPTP. The empirical analyses demonstrate that the change from the BV to the FPTP system brought only marginal effects. The replacement of the PR system by the FPTP was more visible. Quite paradoxically, it increased the number of committees competing in the elections. However, the disproportionality and the share of wasted votes increased significantly, while the fragmentation of local councils decreased. In the municipalities previously using a proportional representation system, the number of candidates decreased visibly; contrary to the initial assumptions, its impact was neutral to the share of elected female councillors. The introduction of the FPTP system significantly limited the already weak presence of nation-wide political parties in local councils.
