Parishes possess a wide selection of instruments for stimulating the development of entrepreneurship, unfortunately the instruments are rarely used as part of a complex, well thought-out strategy that brings about multi-level results. The instruments for entrepreneurship stimulation belong to two major categories: financial and non-financial. One of the primary reasons for investors to select a particular parish can be the existence of a planned and long-term fiscal policy, connected to a stable system of tax preferences in taxes and local fees, and an active strategy for parish investment expenditures. Creating positive conditions for the emergence of new enterprises is the best source of social-economical activation of the local population.
The subject of the paper is the discussion on horizontal redistribution of public revenues among local self-government units. The assumed aim of this redistribution is to equalize the different levels of income and burden of expenditure. The paper lists desirable features of this redistribution, motives for its application, and arguments of its opponents. The analysis of the latter shows that while part of the criticism refers to the essence of horizontal redistribution, significantly more of it concerns the dysfunctions of its mechanism which became apparent after 2008. The criticism focuses, for example, on the criteria for making compensatory payments, the structure of tax revenue indices, the so-called reference period, the amounts of compensatory payments, the criteria for the distribution of the collected amounts. The paper includes suggestions concerning recommended directions of changes in the mechanism of this redistribution.
Discounts and rebates in local taxation are a very media-friendly topic, yet the opinions on the stimulating function of taxation are not supported by meaningful research. The article presents the impact of local governments’ decisions regarding reductions in the tax on means of transport on the location of entities subject to such a tax within the community. The article has a multi-dimensional character, as it is impossible to limit oneself to researching a simplistic relation between tax rates and the number of registered payers of the tax. One must consider additional factors, e.g. the location of new tax payers within a community will also indirectly impact estate taxes, CIT revenues, even the additional revenues from the personal income tax paid by employees. Therefore, it is vital to approach the consequences of local government decisions relating to changes in transport taxation multi-dimensionally.
The article concentrates on vehicle tax, which is interesting not only due to its efficiency, but also high mobility of the tax base. The study aims to examine the correlation between fiscal results and municipal policies, from the perspective of such criteria as the type of municipality and taxpayer category. The study is based on correlation analysis, in which Pearson’s independence test and Spearman’s rho coefficient are used. The results confirm that the tested correlations do exist. Municipal tax policy influences tax revenues of the studied tax, though the results in each unit are different between the current and later periods. Moreover, in the case of vehicle tax, municipal authorities’ main action was to lower the upper tax rates. For municipalities in which these relations were the most visible, econometric models were built. These illustrate the effects of tax policy in relation to certain taxpayer categories.
Uptade from 2.03.2021: Parts of this article were subsequently used in the following publication: Swianiewicz, P., & Łukomska, J. (2016). Local tax competition in Poland?. Miscellanea Geographica, 20(3), 37-43
The paper considers the usefulness of the tax competition theory for the analysis of local tax policies in Poland. The concept has been successfully used for analyses conducted in several European countries, but it has not been systematically tested in Poland yet. There are two types of competition discussed in the paper: classic competition for mobile tax base and yardstick competition, in which local politicians compete for political capital related to a comparison of tax rates with neighbouring municipalities. Due to the limited size and types of local taxes in Poland, it is expected that yardstick competition is more important than classic competition for mobile tax base. The paper also examines regional variation in the intensity of local tax competition, and it formulates the hypothesis that it is more visible in regions with higher bridging social capital. Results of the conducted research indicate that the theory of local tax competition is a useful concept helping to explain the variation in tax policies among Polish municipalities.
