The article considers the peculiarities of local government reform based on the examples of Ukraine, Poland, and Latvia. It is substantiated that the Ukrainian vector of European integration requires the implementation of the principles of deconcentration, decentralisation, and subsidiarity in the local governance systems. It is indicated that regional disproportions in the development of the territory of Ukraine, the inability to implement the reform on the ground in specific administrative-territorial units, the spread of corruption schemes – all these are the consequences of an ineffective model of local self-government and public administration of regional development, inherited from the Soviet system, which requires fundamental changes. Broad powers for sub-regional units characterise the Polish model of the administrative-territorial structure. However, this model is underpinned by a high level of political activity and community self-awareness. The Latvian experience of decentralisation of power emphasises the basic principle of success: the volunteer approach to the reform’s implementation. In conclusion, it is proved that for the successful implementation of the Ukrainian local self-government reform, the following factors are necessary: firstly, the victory of Ukrainian armed forces against the military aggression of Russia; secondly, the elaboration of a legal framework for the development of local self-government and the support of society; thirdly, qualified personnel capable of continuing the implementation of the local self-government reform.
The article is based on a systematic review of the scientific literature addressing the phenomenon of corruption in Poland’s local governments after 1989. It covers the leading scientific disciplines dealing with this issue and discusses the sources of research data, the diversity of research problems within the respective disciplines and their major conclusions. The article concludes with a recommendation of more robust interdisciplinarity and conducting research on both bottom-up anticorruption mechanisms and political repercussions of local government corruption.
The purpose of this article is to analyse both the allocation of the financial support from the 2nd instalment of the CGFLI in the Opolskie Voivodeship and the debate in this region over accusations of the clientelistic allocation of this fund. According to the first hypothesis, the local governments affiliated with the German minority are not treated as politically neutral; therefore, they might be vulnerable to discrimination in allocation of the fund. The second hypothesis claims that the peculiarity of the local political patterns in the voivodeship, which is characterised by the low level of partisanship, gives the ruling party’s regional politicians the opportunity to undermine the thesis on clientelistic distribution of the CGFLI. The research has shown that the local governments affiliated with the German minority have a lower chance of getting financial support when compared to the non-partisan ones. Additionally, the study has distinguished five modes of counter-arguing against the thesis on clientelism, employed by the ruling party politicians of the region.