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Search for phrase: "korupcja"
Bartosz Czepil

The article is based on a systematic review of the scientific literature addressing the phenomenon of corruption in Poland’s local governments after 1989. It covers the leading scientific disciplines dealing with this issue and discusses the sources of research data, the diversity of research problems within the respective disciplines and their major conclusions. The article concludes with a recommendation of more robust interdisciplinarity and conducting research on both bottom-up anticorruption mechanisms and political repercussions of local government corruption.

Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse
The Integrated Regional Operational Programme (IROP) management system in a weak manner prevents possibility of administrative and political corruption. Particularly susceptible to corruption are procedures of choosing projects and new public procurement system. We could list following reasons, why IROP management system is vulnerable to corruption: (1) system is very complicated, (2) division of competences between various public authorities is incorrect, as well as between politicians and civil servants, (3) some institutions are wrongly designed (particularly regional steering committees), (4) blur regulations, for instance not clearly supporting transparency of administrative procedures, (5) lack of special anti-corruption regulations, (6) Polish administrative and political culture. Decision makers preparing a new system for regional programs (2007–2013) should take into consideration conclusions of this paper and revise this system from the point of view of preventing corruption.
Bartosz Czepil

The purpose of this article is to analyse both the allocation of the financial support from the 2nd instalment of the CGFLI in the Opolskie Voivodeship and the debate in this region over accusations of the clientelistic allocation of this fund. According to the first hypothesis, the local governments affiliated with the German minority are not treated as politically neutral; therefore, they might be vulnerable to discrimination in allocation of the fund. The second hypothesis claims that the peculiarity of the local political patterns in the voivodeship, which is characterised by the low level of partisanship, gives the ruling party’s regional politicians the opportunity to undermine the thesis on clientelistic distribution of the CGFLI. The research has shown that the local governments affiliated with the German minority have a lower chance of getting financial support when compared to the non-partisan ones. Additionally, the study has distinguished five modes of counter-arguing against the thesis on clientelism, employed by the ruling party politicians of the region.